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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). The Court's Order of December 14, 2006 (Addendum 
("Add.") A) granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Petitioner Ellsworth Paulsen 
Construction Company ("EPCO") and granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari of 
Cross-Petitioner 51 -SPR-L.L.C. ("51-SPR"), setting forth the two narrow issues 
addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals in Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Co. v. 51-
SPR-L.L.C, 2006 UT App 353, 144 P.3d 261 (Add. C). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This Court granted certiorari on the following issues: 
Issue No. 1. Whether summary judgment was appropriate as to EPCO's 
allegations that 51-SPR was involved in a joint venture rendering it subject to liability 
arising from the venture. 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. §§48-1-3.1,-4 (2002); Bassett v. Baker, 
530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974); Betenson v. Call Auto & Equip. Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1982). 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Waddoups v. 
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, ^ 21, 54 P.3d 1054. On summary judgment, the 
Court must "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party." Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 
1 
2000 UT 71, U 15, 10 P.3d 338. This issue was preserved in 51-SPR's memoranda 
[R.966-68, 2348-54] and at oral argument [Tr. 8463 at 17-34].1 
Issue No. 2. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed the criteria of 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-25. 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-3, -25 (2001). 
Standard of Review: This issue presents questions of law and fact. The Court 
reviews factual determinations for clear error, Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 
1286 (Utah 1993), and questions of law for correctness, State v. Wallace. 2006 UT 86,1 
5, 150 P.3d 540. This issue was preserved in 51-SPR's memoranda [R.3219-20, 3321-
22, 4593, 4706-07], at oral argument [Tr. 8459 at 82-83, 100-04; 8470 at 16-20], and at 
trial [R.7784-86; Tr. 8468 at 644-48]. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutory provisions, whose interpretation is of central importance 
to the appeal, are set forth in their entirety in Addendum D: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 (2001) (mechanics' lien act); 
2. Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-3, -3.1, -4 (2002) (partnership act). 
1
 Citations to the record within this brief are as follows: (1) references to record 
pages are preceded by "R."; (2) portions of the ten transcript volumes are referred to as 
"Tr." followed by the record number (e.g., 8459) and the page; and (3) trial exhibits are 
cited as "PI. Ex." or "Def. Ex." All relevant orders are attached as Addenda, which are 
cited with an "Add." reference. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. THE NATURE OF THE CASE, THE COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
AND ITS DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS. 
This is a mechanic's lien foreclosure action filed by EPCO to foreclose a lien it 
recorded on property known as "Northshore" (the "Northshore Property") owned by 51-
SPR. EPCO also brought claims against Guy Hatch ("Hatch") and Broadstone 
Investments, L.C., ("Broadstone") for failing to pay amounts due under construction 
contracts, and asserted the same claims against 51-SPR, alleging that 51-SPR was Hatch 
and Broadstone's joint venturer. [R.2740, 2745-46.] The trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of EPCO on its contract claim, ruling that 51-SPR was a joint venturer 
with Hatch and Broadstone, and thus shared liability under Broadstone's construction 
contracts with EPCO. See Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment Against 51-SPR 
on Issue of Liability as Joint Venturer With and Partner of Broadstone at 12 (Jan. 4, 
2003) ("Joint Venture Order") (Add. E) [R.3619-30]. 
51-SPR counterclaimed against that EPCO's mechanics' lien was an abusive lien 
under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 to the extent of $78,000, which represented work that 
EPCO did not perform on the Northshore Property, but which another contractor 
performed on other property known as the "Williams Property." After a bench trial, the 
trial court ruled, among other things, that EPCO was not entitled to foreclose the $78,000 
lien, but that EPCO did not violate the abusive lien statute. See Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 10-11 ffif 24-26 (May 18, 2004) (Add. F) [R.8438-8439]. 
3 
Pursuant to its prior joint venture ruling, the trial court awarded damages against 51-SPR 
on EPCO's breach of contract claim. Id. at 9 ffif 20-21. 
EPCO and 51-SPR both appealed to this Court regarding various trial court 
rulings. After the appeal was transferred, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
ruling that the $78,000 lien did not violate the abusive lien statute, but reversed the trial 
court's entry of summary judgment in EPCO's favor with respect to the existence of a 
joint venture. See Ellsworth Paulsen, 2006 UT App 353 at 1fl[ 10-18, 26-29, 34. 
After cross-petitions for certiorari were granted, this Court directed the entered an 
Order dated January 24, 2007, that each party shall file a single brief in this appeal, each 
of which would address both issues on which certiorari was granted. (Add. B). 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
EPCO entered into two construction agreements (the "Construction Contracts") 
with a developer, Hatch and Hatch's company, Broadstone, under which EPCO agreed to 
act as general contractor for the construction of two commercial buildings on the 
Northshore Property. 51-SPR, through its owner, Robert Chimento, entered into an 
agreement with Hatch and Broadstone (the "Agreement") (Add. G), which provided, 
among other things, that 51-SPR would contribute $2.9 million toward the purchase and 
development of the Northshore Property, and take title to the Northshore Property as a 
2
 The Agreement is entitled "This Addendum #2 to Real Estate Purchase Contract 
Between Broadstone Investments, LLC And 51 South Portland Realty Corp. Dated June 
15,2000." 
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tenant in common with Broadstone.3 With Broadstone designated under the Agreement 
as project manager in charge of supervising construction on the Northshore Property, 
EPCO dealt exclusively with Hatch in connection with the development, rather than 51-
SPR. See 2006 UT App 353 at 1fl[ 2, 3. 
The Agreement expressly required Broadstone and Hatch to bear the risk of any 
losses from the purchase and development of the Property, and expressly relieved 51-
SPR of any duty to share in such losses. [Chimento Aff. (Add. H); R.1001 ^ 6.] 
Broadstone and Hatch were responsible for purchasing the Property, obtaining 
construction financing, hiring a general contractor, supervising construction, leasing the 
buildings, managing the Property, and all other costs associated with the project. [Add. 
H; R.1001 Tf 6.] 51-SPR and Broadstone would hold the Property as tenants-in-common. 
[Add. H; R.10011 8.] However, with the exception of one day on which title to the 
Property was vested in Broadstone so it could secure construction financing, 51-SPR was 
the record owner of the Property at all relevant times. [Tr. 8467 at 379-80.] 
Long before entering into the Construction Contracts, Hatch and EPCO 
collaborated on two other construction projects in different Utah County locations—one 
known as Broadstone Square and another on a property known as the "Williams 
Property." In 1999, Hatch contacted EPCO's president, Richard Ellsworth ("Ellsworth"), 
and requested that Ellsworth loan $110,000 to Vintage Construction ("Vintage"), a 
Hatch-related company that was involved in developing Broadstone Square and the 
3
 EPCO refers to the Agreement as a "detailed/joint venture agreement." EPCO's 
Brief at 3. This is a mischaracterization. Whether the Agreement is, in fact, a joint 
venture agreement is one of the two issues before the Court. 
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Williams Property. At the time, Hatch showed Ellsworth a rendering prepared by a third-
party, Hubble Engineering ("Hubble"), for a proposed development of the Williams 
Property. Hubble was not a subcontractor of EPCO and did no work on the Northshore 
Property that Hatch and EPCO later developed. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Lawat1Hf2-3(Add.F). 
Ellsworth assumed that $78,000 of the $110,000 was to finance engineering and 
design work that Hubble had performed on the Williams Property, and the remaining 
$32,000 was to help finance Broadstone Square. Hatch assured Ellsworth that he would 
repay these funds to Ellsworth. Hatch agreed to provide to Ellsworth a change order on 
the first building constructed on the Williams Property in exchange for the $78,000 
payment. The loan was documented at the time simply by an invoice from Vintage to 
EPCO for $110,000, which EPCO paid. Ultimately, the Williams Property was never 
developed. See 2006 UT App 353 at Tflj 2, 3; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law fflf 
3-4 (Add. F); R.8466, Tr. at 32-34, 64, 81; Def. Ex. 28 (Add. I) (check to and invoice 
from Vintage for $110,000). 
By the time Hatch and EPCO developed 51-SPR's unrelated Northshore Property, 
Vintage had not repaid to EPCO the $78,000 loan relating to the Williams Property. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Construction Contracts related exclusively to the 
Northshore Property, and the fact that the $78,000 did not reflect any work performed by 
EPCO or its subcontractors on any project at all, Hatch provided to EPCO a change order 
in the amount of $78,000 so that EPCO could be repaid this loan through the Northshore 
Property's construction loans. Through the change order, Hatch purported to add 
6 
$78,000 to the balance of the Construction Contracts for the Northshore Property for 
work that Hatch and EPCO knew was never performed on the Northshore Property and 
was never performed by EPCO or its subcontractors. See Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law fflf 3-5 (Add. F). 
The construction loan draw requests signed by Hatch and EPCO overdrew the 
construction loan funds on the Northshore Property by hundreds of thousands of dollars. 
When the insolvency of the Northshore Property became apparent to 51-SPR, 51-SPR 
confronted Hatch, who agreed to relinquish to 51-SPR Broadstone's one-half interest in 
the property, and then promptly abandoned the project and fled to Hawaii. See 2006 UT 
App353atf1J3,7n.3. 
Hatch's disappearance prompted EPCO to record a notice of mechanic's lien 
against the Northshore Property. EPCO intentionally included in the amount of its lien 
the $78,000 loan EPCO provided to Vintage in connection with the Williams Property. 
Ellsworth testified that by filing the lien, EPCO intended to procure the $78,000 from 51-
SPR. The trial court found that the $78,000 payment had not relation at all to the 
Construction Contracts for the Northshore Property, and that Hatch or Broadstone—not 
51-SPR—were responsible for repaying the amount to EPCO: 
The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot collect from 51-SPR the 
$78,000 it paid Mr. Hatch/Broadstone. Mr. Hatch's activity and 
participation with respect to the Williams property did not relate to his 
agreements with Mr. Chimento and 51-SPR for the development of the 
Auto Mall/North Shore project, nor was the Williams property part of the 
development of the two North Shore buildings. 
2006 UT App 353 at ffif 26, 29; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^ 12 (Add. C). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Court of Appeals properly reversed the trial court's summary judgment 
that a joint venture was created between 51-SPR and Broadstone because questions of 
fact exist whether there was an agreement to share losses, which is an essential element 
of joint venture. 
2. The Court of Appeals incorrectly affirmed the trial court's dismissal of 51-
SPR's abusive lien claim, which arose from EPCO's effort to exact, through its lien, 
payment by 51-SPR of $78,000 that EPCO had made to Hatch's company for work that 
benefited only the Williams Property, and which was never even performed by EPCO. 
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO EPCO'S PETITION 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY REVERSED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT 51-SPR WAS A JOINT 
VENTURER WITH BROADSTONE. 
This Court granted EPCO's petition for a writ of certiorari on the issue whether 
summary judgment was appropriate as to EPCO's allegations that 51-SPR was involved 
in a joint venture rendering it subject to liability arising from the venture. As argued 
below, the Court of Appeals correctly held that fact questions precluded entry of 
summary judgment against 51-SPR. 
A, The Court of Appeals Properly Held That the Existence of an 
Agreement to Share in Losses Involved a Question of Fact That 
Could Not Be Resolved on Summary Judgment. 
The elements of joint venture present a fact question. In Utah, parties seeking to 
establish the existence of a partnership or joint venture must prove (1) "a community of 
interest in the performance of the common purpose," (2) "a joint proprietary interest in 
8 
the subject matter," (3) "a right to share in the profits," and (4) "a duty to share in any 
losses."4 Betenson v. Call Auto & Equip. Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982); 
Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1974).5 The Court of Appeals properly reversed 
the trial court's summary judgment since the final element, a duty to share losses, 
involved a contested issue of fact. 
The loss-sharing element is essential to a finding of an existence of a partnership. 
See Bassett, 530 P.2d at 3. For example, Betenson concluded as matter of law that no 
joint venture existed where a contract provision for "shared liability for losses" was 
"conspicuous[ly]" absent. 645 P.2d at 686. Similarly, this Court held in Bassett that that 
no joint venture existed where defendant stood to lose his investment in the transaction, 
but had no duty to share in business losses. 530 P.2d at 2. These authorities are directly 
on point, but are largely ignored in EPCO's brief. 
Consistent with the rule that the existence of a joint venture "is ordinarily a 
question of fact," Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987), the Court 
of Appeals held that in the present case, the existence of a duty to share losses is a fact 
The Utah Uniform Partnership Act governs both partnerships and joint ventures. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3.1(2) (2002). A "joint venture" is defined as "an association of 
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a single business enterprise." Id. § 48-1-
3.1(1) (2002); see also Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1987) 
("Joint venturers stand in the same relationship to each other as partners."). 
5
 See also Johanson Bros. Builders v. Board of Review, 222 P.2d 563, 567 (Utah 
1950) (holding that no partnership existed where, among other things, members of the 
alleged partnership were not "chargeable with the losses . . . of operating the business."); 
First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Gillman, 158 B.R. 498, 509 (D. Utah 1993) (holding that 
joint venture did not exist under Utah law because there was no duty to share in other 
party's losses). 
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question and that it could not be inferred on summary judgment simply because the 
parties agreed to share profits. The Court of Appeals recognized the statement in Bassett 
that "the agreement to share losses need not necessarily be stated in specific terms . . . to 
permit [a] court to infer that the parties intend[ed] to share losses as well as profits." 
Bassett 530 P.2d at 2. Even so, the Court of Appeals stated, "Utah case law does not 
appear to support the notion advanced by Ellsworth that Utah courts have routinely made 
such an inference on summary judgment. Instead, cany doubt concerning questions of 
fact, including evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, should be 
resolved in favor of the [party opposing summary judgment].5 Inferring on summary 
judgment a duty to share losses runs counter to this precept." Ellsworth Paulsen, 2006 
UT App 353 at ^ 12 (citation omitted). 
The Court of Appeals properly held that the affidavit of Robert Chimento (Add. 
H), 51-SPR's owner, raised a question of fact whether such a duty existed. Ellsworth 
Paulsen, 2006 UT App 353 at fflf 14-16. In his Affidavit, Chimento testified that the 
parties never intended that that 51-SPR would be liable for losses associated with the 
Northshore Project. Chimento Affidavit fflf 6, 10, 29. For example, Chimento stated that 
"[u]nder the Agreement, Broadstone and Hatch were solely responsible for all expenses, 
costs, losses, and risks associated with the Northshore project." Id. ^ 6. Moreover, he 
stated that 51-SPR "was not liable for any losses, liabilities, or responsibilities relating to 
10 
the Property [and] stood to lose only its investment." Id. j^ 10. Chimento stated that 51-
SPR "never agreed to assume Broadstone's debts or liabilities." Id. f^ 29.6 
Here, as in Betenson, there was no joint venture because the Agreement bestows 
on 51-SPR no duty to share in losses and instead "specifically exclude[s]" such a duty. 
645 P.2d at 686; Add. G. Broadstone—not 51-SPR—was solely responsible for all 
expenses costs, losses, and risks associated with the project. [Id.; R. 1001 f^ 6.] It was 
Broadstone, on its own behalf, that executed all of the contracts associated with the 
Property, including loan documents, construction contracts, construction loans, and 
tenant leases. [Add. K; R.1001 ffif 11-12.] Hatch and Parkinson—Broadstone's 
principals—personally guaranteed the construction loans. [Add. K; R.1001 f^ 13.] 51-
SPR was not a party to any of these guaranties or agreements. [Add. K; R.1001 ^[ 14— 
15.] As a result, under the Agreement, 51-SPR stood to lose only its investment in the 
Property and nothing more. [R.1001 f 10.] Based on these facts and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn therefrom in 51-SPR's favor, the necessary duty to share in 
losses did not exist and as a matter of law, there could be no joint venture. 
6
 EPCO asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the Chimento Affidavit is not 
admissible under the parol evidence rule, since the Agreement was a "fully-integrated 
unambiguous agreement." EPCO's Brief at 21-22. This argument is waived because it 
was not preserved below. Moreover, since EPCO failed to have the affidavit stricken, it 
waived any objections that it may have had to its admissibility. See Pinetree Assocs. v. 
Ephraim City, 2003 UT 6, ^ 19, 67 P.3d 462. In any event, even if EPCO could show 
that the Agreement were silent on the question of loss-sharing, the Agreement would be 
ambiguous and thus susceptible to clarification by extrinsic evidence on that issue. See 
Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, f 15, 133 P.3d 428 ("A contract may be 
ambiguous because it is unclear, it omits terms , or 'the terms used to express the 
intention of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible meanings.'") 
(citation omitted, emphasis supplied). 
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Disregarding the plain language of the Agreement and dismissing Chimento's 
sworn testimony as "bald assertions," the trial court "inferred" a duty to share in losses 
from three sources, not one of which is legally sufficient. Joint Venture Order at 9-11 
(Add. E). First, the trial court inferred a duty to share in losses from 51-SPR's agreement 
to mortgage its ownership in the Property so that Broadstone and Hatch could secure 
construction financing. Id. at 10. However, by mortgaging its interest in the Property 
(which had been purchased with 51-SPR's investment funds), 51-SPR stood to lose only 
its investment and nothing more. As a matter of law, the risk of losing one's investment 
does not evidence a duty to share in losses. See Bassett, 530 P.2d at 2. To hold 
otherwise would turn into a partner the typical investor who stands to lose the extent of 
its investment. The Court of Appeals agreed with 51-SPR, noting that these facts "when 
viewed in the light most favorable to SPR, also support the assertion that SPR may not 
have agreed to share in losses." Ellsworth Paulsen, 2006 UT App 353 at If 17. 
Second, the trial court inferred a duty to share losses from the fact that Broadstone 
and 51-SPR were to hold the Property as tenants in common, which the court said brings 
"all the accompanying liabilities of a real property owner." Joint Venture Order at 10 
(Add. B). This fact is immaterial because all common owners of real property are subject 
to such "liabilities." But under Utah law, common ownership of property does not of 
itself establish a partnership, even if there is a sharing of profits. See Utah Code Ann. § 
48-1-4(2) (2002). Moreover, liabilities incidental to property ownership are not losses 
incurred in the operation of the business for which a partner has a duty to share. Again, 
the Court of Appeals agreed with 51-SPR's argument. The Court stated that these facts, 
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"when viewed in their proper light on summary judgment, together with Chimento's 
affidavit, also give rise to equally plausible inferences that contradict the trial court's 
conclusion that SPR agreed to share in the losses of the project." Ellsworth Paulsen, 
2006 UT App 353 at f 17. The Court stated that "the fact that SPR's capital investment 
was put at risk by the Agreement quite reasonably supports the inference that SPR, like 
any investor, stood only to lose its investment and nothing more if the project failed." 
Ellsworth Paulsen, 2006 UT App 353 at ^ 17 n.7. 
Third, the trial court inferred a duty to share in losses from 51-SPR's later 
settlement agreement with Central Bank—not Broadstone or Hatch—to guaranty 
repayment of the construction loans. Joint Venture Order at 11 (Add. E). This fact is 
immaterial because 51-SPR had no duty under the Agreement to settle with the bank or 
assume the mortgage. 51-SPR only did so to avoid foreclosure after Hatch defaulted on 
the loans and fled the jurisdiction. [R.2178 at 138-39.] 51-SPR's decision to save its 
investment does not change its unambiguous agreement with Broadstone not to share in 
losses. The Court of Appeals accepted 51-SPR's argument: 
The trial court inferred from these actions that "[SPR] voluntarily put its 
own property at greater risk of loss" than would an "investor" or "simple 
creditor," and that SPR had thereby waived the protection of language in 
the Agreement limiting SPR's obligation arising by reason of any note or 
guaranty for construction financing. The court concluded that these actions 
manifested SPR's duty to share in losses. But it is equally plausible to infer 
from such actions that SPR was merely acting to protect its investment— 
and the potential return on its investment—by seeking to avoid foreclosure 
of the construction loans. Moreover, by mortgaging its interest in the 
Northshore Property, SPR did put the property at risk, but arguably only 
stood to lose its capital investment—which was used to purchase the 
property in the first place—and nothing more. 
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Ellsworth Paulsen. 2006 UT App 353 at If 17 n.8. 
The Court of Appeals also stated that Chimento's denial of a duty on the part of 
51-SPR to share losses was supported by certain provisions in the Agreement (Add. G). 
The Court stated: "The provisions in the Agreement that expressly release SPR from all 
obligations arising by way of any note or guaranty for construction financing and instead 
place the sole obligation of obtaining and repaying construction financing and other cash 
needs of the project on Broadstone and Hatch, at the very least give rise to the inference 
that SPR did not agree to share in other financial obligations, i.e., the net operating losses 
of the Northshore Property." Ellsworth Paulsen, 2006 UT App 353 at f 16. 
In addition, the Court of Appeals addressed the provisions in the Agreement 
guarantying SPR "a 10% return on its capital commencing December 1, 2000," and 
requiring Broadstone and Hatch to guaranty to "contribute any and all sums to the project 
needed for payment of such return." (Add. G.) These provisions, held the Court of 
Appeals, "support Chimento's affidavit and the inference that even if the project lost 
money, Broadstone alone bore the responsibility to contribute funds to cover the losses 
and to ensure that SPR, as an investor, received its guarantied return." Ellsworth Paulsen, 
2006 UT App 353 at Tf 16. When Chimento's affidavit testimony is viewed together with 
the provisions of Addenum No. 2 discussed above, the Court of Appeals stated, those 
provisions, "actually lend credence to his assertions and give rise to reasonable inferences 
favorable to SPR's position." Id. at f 15. 
Because there were "equally plausible inferences to be drawn from the evidence," 
the Court of Appeals held that summary judgment should not have been granted. Id. at }^ 
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18. The Court of Appeals based its ruling on well-established standards for judicial 
review of summary judgments. 2006 UT App 353 atfflf 12, 13, 14, 18. Those standards 
include the rule that a '"genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the 
record, reasonable minds could differ' on any material issue." Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. 
Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). Moreover, "[a] party 
opposing the motion is required only to show that there is a material issue of fact. 
Affidavits and depositions submitted in support of and in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment may be used only to determine whether a material issue of fact exists, 
not to determine whether one party's case is less persuasive than another's or is not likely 
to succeed in a trial on the merits." Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 896 P.2d 926, 
928 (Utah 1993). The Court of Appeals also cited Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick 
Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[A]ny doubt concerning questions of fact, 
including evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, should be 
resolved in favor of the [party opposing summary judgment]."), and Goodnow v. 
Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, PI8, 44 P.3d 704 (Wilkins, J., concurring in the result) ("Where, 
as here, equally plausible contrary inferences may be drawn, neither party should have 
been granted summary judgment."). 
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the existence of a joint venture is a fact 
question that needs to be resolved at trial. EPCO attacks the opinion, saying that it "lacks 
cogency," "elevates form over substance," and "lacks proportionality because it 
acknowledges the presence of four of the elements of a joint venture, but then strains at a 
nat [sic] in allowing for the possibility that the joint venture was never formed by 
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requiring EPCO to prove the parties' intentions as to the agreement." EPCO's Brief at 
21. Despite the absence in the Agreement of a provision that 51 -SPR had a duty to share 
losses and despite the affidavit of Robert Chimento, which flatly denied that there was 
any such duty, EPCO urges this Court to adopt a rule that an agreement to share losses 
"must be inferred by operation of law from the presence of the other four elements, and 
especially from the agreement to share in profits." EPCO's Brief at 11. In other words, 
according to EPCO, evidence of an agreement to share profits without more will satisfy 
the proof requirement of a duty to share losses as a matter of law even in the face of 
controverted evidence over the existence of an agreement to share losses. In EPCO's 
view, the trial court's summary judgment was proper and summary judgment would 
always be appropriate where there was an agreement to share profits despite the existence 
of equally plausible inferences that could be drawn from the evidence. 
EPCO argues that the "Basset [sic] elements were evidence that tended to support 
a finding of joint venture, but not prerequisites thereto" and that the B as sett elements 
"are matters to be considered when making the joint venture determination, but none are 
independent conditions precedent to the creation of a partnership." EPCO's Brief at 18 
(emphasis in original). In its efforts to avoid the necessity of proving the element of a 
duty to share losses, EPCO even goes so far as to characterize the loss-sharing element as 
a "trivial point." EPCO's Brief at 19. Requiring proof of a duty to share losses as an 
element of a partnership, EPCO argues, "is just bad law." EPCO's Brief at 20. To 
EPCO, loss-sharing is not an element that need be proved. 
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EPCO's position flatly contradicts all of the prior Utah cases that specifically 
identify a duty to share losses as an element of a partnership or joint venture. This is a 
key difference between the Court of Appeals' opinion and EPCO's position. EPCO 
would relegate loss-sharing of a partnership from an essential element to mere evidence. 
In EPCO's view, a failure of proof of that element is not fatal to a finding of a 
partnership, even if the existence of an agreement to share losses involves conflicting 
evidence. According to EPCO, the existence of a fact question on that issue does not 
require resolution at trial, since that element is not essential in any event. This view is 
unsupported by every case in Utah that has identified the elements of a joint venture or 
partnership. As discussed above, a duty to share losses is not merely evidence, but an 
essential element that must be proven. Since the existence of that duty is disputed in the 
present case, the issue should not have been resolved on summary judgment. 
EPCO implicitly acknowledges the factual nature of a determination whether a 
joint venture exists. EPCO argues for a rule that weighs the "overall facts" and that 
would "brush aside or ignore" the need to prove a duty to share losses. EPCO's Brief at 
18. "Stated differently," EPCO asserts, "when the agreement is harmonized as a whole 
with all of its sub-parts, it does not have the look, taste, smell, and feel of 51-SPR as a 
mere investor. Rather all of 51-SPR 's acts and statements lead to the inexorable 
conclusion that it was either a principal to Broadstone acting as agent, or full-on equity 
partner with Broadstone, with all of the rights and duties attendant thereto." EPCO's 
Brief at 22 n.14 (emphasis in original). While arguments about the "look, taste, smell, 
and feel" of the agreement could well be presented during a trial, they have no place in 
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an argument defending a summary judgment entered as a matter of law. On summary 
judgment, the Court must "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Surety Underwriters v. E & C 
Trucking, Inc.. 2000 UT 71, ^ 15, 10 P.3d 338. Viewing the facts in the present case in a 
light most favorable to 51-SPR, the Court of Appeals properly held that there is a genuine 
dispute of fact on a material issue, which precludes summary judgment. 
The sharing of losses distinguishes a mere investor from a joint venturer. Under 
the EPCO rule, however, every Utah investor who had agreed to share profits could 
deemed a joint venturer and held responsible for losses incurred by the project in which 
the investor had invested, assuming other elements of joint venture were met.7 Such a 
broad-brush approach would sweep many investors into the joint venture net, which 
could, in turn, have a potentially far-reaching chilling effect on investments in this state. 
Under Utah law, an investor's sharing of profits, by itself, does not make the investor a 
joint venturer if there is no duty to share losses. This is a fundamental difference 
between an investor and a joint venturer: an investor is not responsible for a project's 
losses while a joint venturer is. See Utah Uniform Partnership Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
48-1-12(1) (2002) (partners are liable for partnership debts, either jointly or jointly and 
severally depending on the nature of the debt). EPCO's proposed rule goes too far and, if 
adopted, would create troubling precedent for investors in this state. 
7
 The other elements include "a mutual right to control." Bassett, 530 P.2d at 3. 
Venture capital and other investors frequently seek the right to exercise some degree of 
control over the companies in which they invest, without becoming partners. 
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EPCO also argues that "where other elements of a partnership are present, a 
financial partner and labor partner cannot legally limit their liability to third-party 
venders [sic] by agreement amongst themselves. Thus, their private intentions do not 
come into the analysis." EPCO's Brief at 12. EPCO asserts further that the Court of 
Appeals' opinion "permits the financial partner to pick and choose what debts it pays by 
simply defining such debts as 'losses.'" Id. 51-SPR does not dispute that joint venturers 
are jointly liable for the debts and obligations of the joint venture under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 48-l-12(l)(b) (2002). This issue is not before the Court. The issue here is whether 51-
SPR is, in fact, a joint venturer, which depends entirely on whether the parties agreed that 
51-SPR would be responsible for losses incurred on the Northshore Project. The Court of 
Appeals properly held that the existence of such a duty cannot be determined as a matter 
of law in the fact of controverted evidence. 
B. The Court of Appeals9 Opinion Does Not Conflict with Prior 
Supreme Court Rulings in Mud Control or Cutler. 
There is no conflict between the Court of Appeals' opinion in the present case and 
the 1954 case of Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P.2d 854 (1954), 
as EPCO argues. EPCO's Brief at 11-12. There, the Court held that "an agreement to 
share losses is not a condition precedent to the existence of a mining partnership." 269 
P.2d at 859 (emphasis supplied) (citing Bentley v. Brossard. 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736, 743 
(discussing elements of mining partnership)). Mud Control is either limited to its facts 
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and applies only to mining partnerships or it has been superseded by Betenson and 
Bassett which require proof of an agreement to share in losses. Neither Betenson nor 
Bassett made any mention of Mud Control suggesting that it has little relevance today 
with respect to the elements of a joint venture. 
EPCO also argues that the Court of Appeals' opinion is in conflict with this 
Court's ruling in Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975). EPCO's Brief at 13-14. 
EPCO did not argue Cutler before the Court of Appeals and is precluded from raising it 
now. See DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) ("[Ijssues not raised in the 
court of appeals may not be raised on certiorari unless the issue arose for the first time 
out of the court of appeals' decision."). 
Even if this Court considers EPCO's argument regarding Cutler, there is no 
conflict between that case and the Court of Appeals' opinion. Cutler did not address 
whether a duty to share losses was essential to finding a partnership or joint venture, or 
whether such a duty could be inferred from an agreement to share profits as a matter of 
law in spite of a fact issue over the existence of such a duty. The Cutler opinion merely 
observed in dicta that when two parties "engage in a venture for their mutual benefit or 
profit, that is generally held to be a partnership." Id at 1351. This broad, general 
statement provides no analytical assistance in the present case and the Court of Appeals 
did not err by following Betenson, 645 P.2d at 686, and Bassett, 530 P.2d at 3, which 
The Court recognized that "Mining Partnerships developed as a special type of 
partnership peculiarly adapted to serve the mining industry (including the oil and gas 
field)." Id. at 91 (emphasis supplied). 
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detail the individual "essential" elements of joint venture, including a duty to share in 
losses. 
Even assuming that Cutler somehow conflicts with the Court of Appeals' opinion, 
EPCO does not explain why the Court of Appeals should have followed Cutler instead of 
Betenson and Bassett. Instead of attempting to distinguish or explain Betenson, EPCO 
chose to ignore that case entirely, which is not mentioned in EPCO's brief. 
C. The Court of Appeals9 Opinion Does Not Conflict with 
Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian. 
EPCO argues that the Court of Appeals' opinion is contrary to the opinion of 
another panel of the Court of Appeals in Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 2006 UT App 165, 
135 P.3d 904. See EPCO's Brief at 17-18. Mardanlou did not hold that a duty to share 
losses could be inferred on summary judgment from an agreement to share profits and did 
not even address the issue of sharing losses. Moreover, Mardanlou was decided after a 
trial, not on summary judgment. The Mardanlou case illustrates the fact-intensive nature 
of the issue whether a partnership or a joint venture exists. The Court of Appeals noted 
in that case that the evidence could have supported a ruling either way. Id. at f^ 18 n.6 
("We note, on the state of the evidence in this matter, that had the trial court not been 
convinced of a partnership, we would likely have affirmed that result as well.") 
According to EPCO, Mardanlou held that the elements of a partnership in Bassett 
v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974), are only "general evidence of the formation of a joint 
venture, but do not require absolute proof for each such element in order to establish a 
joint venture." EPCO's Brief at 17. However, Mardanlou did not hold that the Bassett 
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elements are only evidentiary. Instead, it stated that the definition of a partnership in 
Bassett 530 P.2d at 3, "does not demand absolute proof of each factor in every case, 
indicating that the necessity of each factor will be based largely on the facts of the case." 
IdL at Tf 15 (emphasis supplied). It is difficult to see how this statement is in conflict with 
the Court of Appeals' opinion in the present case since the Court did nothing more than 
hold that fact questions precluded summary judgment. Mardanlou simply does not hold 
that a court can find the existence of a joint venture on summary judgment in the face of 
conflicting evidence. Consistent with that rule, EPCO has the burden of proving all of 
the necessary factual elements. Because the existence of an agreement to share losses is a 
disputed fact, that issue must be resolved at trial, not on summary judgment. 
D. Cases from Other Jurisdictions Do Not Require a Different 
Result. 
EPCO's resort to other jurisdictions in unavailing because Utah precedent controls 
and because other jurisdictions follow similar principles. While EPCO has cited several 
cases that suggest that a court can infer an agreement to share losses based on the 
existence of the other elements of a joint venture, EPCO's Brief at 14-15, not one of 
those courts found that a joint venture existed as a matter of law on summary judgment in 
the face of evidence that the parties did not have an agreement to share losses. See Parks 
v. Riverside Ins. Co., 308 F.2d 175, 180 (10th Cir. 1962) (inferring agreement to share 
losses as matter of law based on plaintiffs satisfaction of other partnership elements, but 
not indicating that defendant presented contrary evidence); Stilwell v. Trutanich, 178 Cal. 
App. 2d 614, 618-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (upholding lower court's decision not to 
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dismiss complaint that had alleged cause of action for accounting even though agreement 
did not provide for sharing of losses and stating that "in the absence of agreement, the 
law implies a provision that losses are to be shared among parties in the same proportion 
as profits"); Florida Tomato Packers v. Wilson, 296 So.2d 536, 539-540 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1974) (stating that an agreement to share losses may impliedly exist as a matter of law 
where other partnership elements are met and then upholding lower court's decision to 
send question of joint venture to the jury); Johnco, Inc. v. Jameson Interests, 741 So. 2d 
867, 871 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that an agreement to share losses can be inferred 
and then upholding lower court's determination that there was no partnership agreement). 
Rather, courts in other jurisdictions generally infer the existence of an agreement 
to share losses only in the absence of contrary evidence. See Viking Realty Inc. v. 
Balzebre, 535 So.2d 687 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988) ("The law is well-settled that parties to a 
joint venture, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, share equally, not only in 
the profits, but also in the losses of the venture.") (emphasis added); Farmers & 
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 250 N.W. 214, 218 (Iowa 1933) (holding that express 
agreement on subject of losses will negate sharing of losses, which in turn will negate 
existence of partnership); Latiolais v. BFI of Louisiana, 567 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (La. Ct. 
App. 1990) (holding that agreement to share losses may be inferred if consistent with 
overall terms of parties' agreement, but "whether the parties, by their agreement, 
anticipated a sharing of losses is clearly an issue of fact"); Hoose v. Smith, 198 S.W.2d 
23, 27 (Mo. 1946) (holding that evidence of no intended partnership may rebut prima 
facie evidence of partnership). 
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Here, as detailed in Point I (A), above, the Agreement itself, as well as the 
Chimento Affidavit, demonstrate at minimum a question of fact regarding any duty to 
share in losses. Rather than making a decision about the parties' intentions as a matter of 
law, the district court should have allowed a jury to hear Chimento's testimony and 
determine, as a matter of fact, whether Chimento's testimony indicated that the parties 
did not intend to form a joint venture. 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF 51-SPR'S CROSS-PETITION 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING THAT EPCO'S LIEN FOR $78,000 WAS NOT 
AN ABUSIVE LIEN UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-25. 
EPCO's mechanic's lien included the sum of $78,000, which EPCO paid to 
Hatch's company Vintage for work that Vintage had done by Hubble on the Williams 
Property. 51-SPR claimed that the $78,000 lien was abusive under Utah Code Ann. § 38-
1-25, but the Court of Appeals disagreed. This Court should reverse because the Court of 
Appeals incorrectly construed the abusive lien statute. 
A. The Court of Appeals Erroneously Held That Subsection 
(1Kb) of the Abusive Lien Statute Requires Proof of 
Criminal Intent. 
The abusive lien statute does not, as the Court of Appeals held, require a showing 
of criminal intent. A property owner can satisfy the abusive lien statute by showing, 
through any one of three subsections, that the contractor: 
intentionally cause[d] a claim of lien against any property, which 
contains a greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or filed: 
(a) with the intent to cloud the title; 
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(b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of 
the excessive claim of lien more than is due; or 
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or benefit. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25(1). 51-SPR filed a claim against EPCO under this statute with 
regard to $78,000 of EPCO's mechanic's lien, which did not benefit the Northshore 
Property in any way. 
In its cross-petition, 51-SPR does not challenge any of the findings of fact below, 
but instead only the legal conclusions drawn by the Court of Appeals regarding the 
abusive lien claim. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the $78,000 lien did not 
represent work that EPCO performed on the Northshore Property and that EPCO was not 
entitled to recover the $78,000. Rejecting EPCO's claim to recover the $78,000, the 
Court of Appeals relied on the rule that a mechanic's lien can only be filed against 
property concerning which the contractor has rendered professional service. See 
Ellsworth Paulsen, 2006 UT App 353 at t 27 ("Given that the trial court found the 
$78,000 was not related to the Northshore Property, but rather to another of Hatch's 
projects, Ellsworth was not entitled to include the $78,000 as part of its lien on the 
Northshore Property."). As the trial court's unchallenged findings found, "the $78,000 
was unrelated to the Northshore Property and not part of the Agreement between Hatch 
andSPR." 2006 UT App 353, If 29. 51-SPR does not disagree with this ruling. 
Looking beyond the plain language of section 38-l-25(l)(b), however, the Court 
of Appeals incorrectly added a criminal intent requirement where none exists. The Court 
of Appeals erroneously held that EPCO's lien on 51-SPR's property was not abusive and 
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rejected 51-SPR's argument that EPCO's $78,000 lien was abusive, even though EPCO 
had recorded the lien knowing (1) that it was not for any work that EPCO did on the 
Northshore Property, and (2) that the $78,000 was to repay EPCO's loan to Hatch's 
company, Vintage, for work performed by Hubble on the Williams Property. In this case 
of first impression, the Court of Appeals held that 51-SPR was required to show criminal 
intent and failed to do so, an argument not made by EPCO in the district court. 
Acknowledging that subparagraph (l)(b) of section 38-1-25 contained no intent 
requirement, the Court held that since the "abusive lien statute is a criminal statute and it 
does not 'clearly indicate[] a legislative purpose5 to impose strict liability for the 
crime, . . . the default culpable mental state of 'intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall 
suffice to establish criminal responsibility5 under the last two variants of the abusive lien 
statute." Ellsworth Paulsen, 2006 UT App 353 at Tf 31 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
102 (2003)). As detailed below, this ruling was in error and should be reversed. 
1. The Court of Appeals9 Legal Theory Was Never 
Raised by the Parties. 
In importing the intent requirement of the criminal code into this civil claim for an 
abusive lien, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling on a ground that was 
never raised in the trial court and which were not briefed or argued before the Court of 
Appeals. Although an appellate court can affirm on any basis, even one that was not 
considered by the trial court, see First Equity Fed. Inc. v. Phillips Development LC, 2002 
UT 56, f 11, 52 P.3d 1137, this rule "does not give appellate courts license to pull from 
thin air alternate or novel legal theories with which to affirm decisions below." Because 
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such alternate legal theories "may come as a surprise to the parties," the Court of Appeals 
should have afforded the parties "an opportunity to address and argue an alternate legal 
theory or ground in supplemental briefs to the court." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ^[13, 
52 P.3d 1158. Based on the Court of Appeals' failure to do so, the Court should reverse. 
2. The Court of Appeals9 Judicial Insertion of an 
"Intent" Requirement in Subsection (l)(b) Makes 
the Statute Redundant 
The Court of Appeals erred in injecting an intent requirement in subsection (l)(b) 
of the abusive lien statute, section 38-1-25, where no such requirement is set forth in the 
statute. According to the Court, "although Ellsworth 'intentionally causefd] a claim of 
lien . . . which contain fed] a greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or filed,' it 
did not do so with the requisite culpable mental state to cloud the title, to exact from the 
owner more than was due, or to procure some other unjustified advantage." 2006 UT 
App 353 at Tf 34 (emphasis supplied). An owner need not show "intent" to satisfy 
subsection (l)(b), however, which is the provision under which 51-SPR brought its 
abusive lien claim against EPCO. See 2006 UT App 353 at f^ 32. The conclusion that 
"Ellsworth 'intentionally cause[d] a claim of lien . . . which contained] a greater demand 
than the sum due to be recorded or filed," was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the 
statute. 
Only subsection (l)(a) requires specific intent, providing that there be "intent" to 
cloud title to the property. Subsection (l)(b), in contrast (like subsection (l)(c)), does not 
condition liability on a lien claimant's subjective belief that it is seeking more than is due. 
It does not require a showing that the contractor specifically "intend" to exact more than 
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is due. See id. § 38-l-25(l)(b). There is no basis in the plain language of the statute for 
reading in such an intent requirement. 
The judicial insertion of an "intent" requirement within the three subsections, (a), 
(b), and (c) of Section 38-1-25(1) would render the statute impermissibly redundant. See 
State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("' Whenever possible, 
statutes should be construed so that no portion is superfluous,' and, as such, they should 
not be read to include a pure redundancy.") (citation omitted).9 This is because 
subsection (l)(a) already includes the words "with the intent." Id. § 38-l-25(l)(a). If the 
word "intentionally" in the statute were a modifier of the three subsections, then "intent" 
would be redundant and superfluous because "intentionally" and "with intent" mean the 
same thing. The Court should "presume that the legislature used each word advisedly 
and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." State v. 
Holm, 2006 UT 31,116, 137 P.3d 726 (quoting CT. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35,1 9, 977 
P.2d479). 
The only way to avoid such a redundancy is to construe "intentionally" in 
subsection (1) simply as a modifier of the language that immediately follows—"causes a 
claim of lien against any property." Id. § 38-1-25(1). The Court of Appeals correctly 
concluded that 51-SPR satisfied this intent requirement. Slee 2006 UT App 353 at f 34. 
9
 See also State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, t 8, 52 P.3d 1276 (holding that courts 
should "avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or 
inoperative."); State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^ 34, 52 P.3d 1210 ("In analyzing a statute's 
plain language, we must attempt to give each part of the provision a relevant and 
independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms."). 
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The inquiry should have stopped there because subsection (l)(b) imposes no additional 
requirement to prove specific intent. 
The legislature's inclusion of the express language "with the intent" in subsection 
(l)(a) and the omission of any reference to intent or a mental state in subsections (l)(b) 
and (1 )(c) denotes an unambiguous legislative intent that no showing of intent be 
required to satisfy subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c) other than the general requirement to 
prove that the lien filing be done "intentionally." The Court of Appeals acknowledged 
the omission of intent language in subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c), noting that "subsection 
(l)(a) speaks of 'the intent to cloud the title,' while subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c) do not 
further prescribe what culpable mental state the lien claimant must have with respect to 
filing the lien 'to exact. . . more than is due' or 'to procure any unjustified advantage or 
benefit.'" 2006 UT App 353 at Tf 31. 
Yet, by going outside the plain language to suggest that there must be proof of 
"intent, knowledge, or recklessness . . . to establish criminal responsibility" under 
subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c), id., the Court of Appeals essentially eliminated any 
meaning of the word "intent" in subsection (l)(a). This ruling should be reversed on 
certiorari. 
EPCO ignores the double reference to an intent requirement in the statute. Rather 
than explain why the Court of Appeals' interpretation of that section does not render the 
word "intent" in subsection (l)(a) superfluous and redundant, EPCO accuses 51-SPR of 
using "dubious cannons [sic] of statutory interpretation and fuzzy grammar." EPCO's 
Brief at 27. There is nothing "fuzzy," however, about 51-SPR's argument that if the 
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word "intentionally" in the statute were a modifier of the three subsections, then the word 
"intent" in subsection (l)(a) would be redundant and superfluous because "intentionally" 
and "with intent" mean the same thing. To EPCO, "the word 'intentionally' in the 
introductory sentence making it a crime to file and [sic] excessive lien should be read to 
mean 'maliciously,' and the word 'intent' in the sub-part should be read to mean 
'purposefully.'" EPCO's Brief at 29 n.20. This effort to rewrite the statute is not 
founded on the plain language, as it must be, but entirely ignores the intent requirement 
in subsection (l)(a) and the absence of such a requirement in subsections (l)(b) and 
(l)(c). 
EPCO insists that the word "intentionally" in the first sentence of subsection (1) 
"modifies all three of the subordinate passages" and that it is "clear from the statute" that 
"all three types of actions, clouding title, exacting excessive money, and procuring an 
unjustified advantage, are intent-, mens rea-type acts." EPCO's Brief at 29. EPCO fails 
to explain why this interpretation is so clear from the statute nor does it state why the 
legislature used the word "intent" in subsection (l)(a) but not in (l)(b) and (l)(c). To 
EPCO, the "intent" requirement in (l)(a) is insignificant, nothing more than a legislative 
attempt "to accentuate the notion that filing of the lien—even if accidentally overstated— 
was not proscribed." EPCO's Brief at 29 n.21. The problem with this interpretation is 
that it has no basis in the actual text of statute. EPCO's inability to provide a sound 
rationale—from the language of the statute itself—for construing the statute underscores 
the error in its interpretation. 
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In the end, EPCO sweeps aside any attempt at a careful, textually based 
interpretation of the statute with the broad assertion that an allegation that a lien is 
abusive is "fraught with the connotation of a culpable mental state requiring a willful, 
flagrant, or reckless indifference to the property rights of another." EPCO's Brief at 29. 
EPCO fails to identify any language in the statute that supports its assumptions about 
legislative intent. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals appears to have agreed with 
EPCO's interpretation. This Court should reverse the holding that EPCO's $78,000 lien 
was not abusive. 
3. The Court of Appeals Improperly Held That 
Subsection (l)(b) Does Not Clearly Indicate a 
Legislative Purpose to Impose Strict Liability. 
The Court of Appeals mistakenly justified the insertion of an "intent" requirement 
in subsection (l)(b) by concluding that, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (2003), the 
abusive lien statute does not clearly indicate a legislative purpose to impose strict 
liability. See 2006 UT App 353 at If 31. Under this provision of the Criminal Code, for 
every offense not involving strict liability that does not specify a culpable mental state, 
"intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (2003). However, the statute provides further that an 
"offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a 
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct 
prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state." Id. 
Here, the plain language of the abusive lien statute demonstrates a clear legislative 
purpose that proof of a culpable mental state is not required to satisfy subsection (l)(b). 
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As discussed above, the legislature included an express "intent" requirement in 
subsection (l)(a), but conspicuously avoided any reference to intent within subsections 
(l)(b) and (l)(c). The Court must presume that the legislature used the term "intent" 
advisedly in subsection (l)(a) and also advisedly left such a term out of subsections (l)(b) 
and (l)(c). See State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ^ 16, 137 P.3d 726. The fact that subsection 
(l)(a)'s express language requires a showing of criminal intent while subsections (l)(b) 
and (l)(c) do not, demonstrates a clear legislative intent that criminal intent need not be 
shown to satisfy the latter two subsections. 
The Court can look outside the narrow confines of subsection (l)(b) to determine 
whether there is a clear indication of legislative intent to make a violation of that portion 
of the abusive lien statute a strict liability offense. For example, in State v. Martinez, 
2002 UT 80, 52 P.3d 1276, this Court considered whether unlawful sexual intercourse 
with a minor was a strict liability offense even though the statute, Section 76-5-401, did 
not include a mens rea element and did not specify that offenders would be held strictly 
liable. This Court referred to other statutes than the one at issue in determining that the 
legislature had manifested a clear intent to make that crime a strict liability offense. Slee 
id. at Tffl 10-11 ("The plain language of section 76-5-401 does not contain a mens rea 
element yet we may look to the relationship between other sections of the criminal code 
and the section at issue for further guidance on legislative intent."); see also State ex rel. 
W.C.P., 1999 UT App 35, 974 P.2d 302 (applying same analysis and reaching same 
conclusion with respect to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402.1 regarding rape of a child). 
32 
Likewise, as demonstrated above, the Court cannot interpret subsections (l)(b) and 
(l)(c) in isolation without considering how the legislature drafted subsection (1) and 
subsection (l)(a). In the words of Martinez, the Court can look "to the relationship 
between other sections" of the code "and the section at issue for further guidance on 
legislative intent." Martinez, 2002 UT 80, f 11. In determining whether subsection 
(l)(b) imposes strict liability, the Court should consider the inclusion of the word 
"intentionally" in subsection (1) and the words "with the intent" in subsection (l)(a). 
Imposing a criminal intent standard in subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c) where none 
exists in the plain language would defeat the purpose of the abusive lien statute of 
"discouraging abuse of the lien process by creating a strong disincentive for a would-be 
litigant to wrongly inflict a mechanic's lien on a property owner whose property was not 
actually enhanced." A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guv, 2004 UT 47, ^  24, 
94 P.3d 270. Here, where the Court of Appeals correctly held that EPCO "'intentionally 
cause[d] a claim of lien . . . which contained] a greater demand than the sum due to be 
recorded or filed,'" 2006 UT App 353 at ^ 34 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25(1)), it 
erred in concluding that the statute required some additional showing of criminal intent. 
4. Even if Specific Intent Were Necessary, the Trial 
Court's Finding of No Such Intent Was Against the 
Clear Weight of the Evidence. 
Even if subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c) of the abusive lien statute were read to 
require proof of "intent, knowledge, or recklessness" under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 
(2003), the Court of Appeals still erred in upholding the finding that EPCO acted in good 
faith when the trial court also found that EPCO intentionally liened 51-SPR's property 
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for money that EPCO knew it had loaned to Vintage for work that EPCO assumed 
Hubble had performed on the Williams Property. See Findings of Fact fflf 2-4, 12 (Add. 
F). 
The trial court's finding that the $78,000 was unrelated to the Northshore Project 
is supported by the evidence presented at trial. The evidence from EPCO's Richard 
Ellsworth showed that Broadstone and Hatch had previously developed a project in Utah 
County known as Broadstone Square. [Tr. 8466 at 80-81, 87-88.] EPCO served as 
Hatch's general contractor on the project. [Id.] In August 1999, in the course of that 
development, EPCO's president, Mr. Ellsworth recommended that Hatch look at 
developing a parcel owned by a Mr. Williams (the "Williams Property"), which 
neighbored EPCO's American Fork office. [Id. at 32-33.]10 
Hatch later came to EPCO's office with a rendering he had obtained from Hubble 
of proposed office buildings on the Williams Property, and requested that EPCO pay 
$78,000 for development work done on the Williams Property. [Tr. 8466 at 34, 60-61, 
65, 73-74; Def. Ex. 62.] Hatch agreed that he would give EPCO a change order on the 
first building constructed on the Williams Property in exchange for the payment. [R. 
8466, Tr. at 62, 67, 81.] Since the Williams Property was never developed, Hatch gave 
Hatch and Ellsworth referred to the anticipated project on the Williams Property 
as "Northshore," though the development of the Williams Property had nothing to do 
with the project by the same name that is the subject of this action. The Northshore 
Project that was eventually built was on an entirely different piece of property. See 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4 ^ 3, 9 Iflf 21-22 (Add. F) (recognizing that 
$78,000 payment was intended for "the Williams North Shore project" and "with respect 
to the Williams property request") (emphasis supplied). 
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EPCO a change order for $78,000 on the Northshore Project, dated February 28, 2001 
(18 months after EPCO paid the $78,000 to Vintage). [Def. Exs. 27, 28.] 
Ellsworth testified at trial that he assumed that the $78,000 would pay for 
engineering and design work on the Williams Property. [Id. at 61, 65, 66, 78.] Ellsworth 
conceded that he knew the $78,000 payment to Vintage was not based on work provided 
by EPCO or its subcontractors [R. 8466, Tr. at 85-86], a fact that EPCO does not dispute. 
See EPCO's Brief at 34 ("The testimony has ever been that the $78,000 was to be used 
for engineering services to Hubble Engineering.") EPCO received a bill from Vintage, 
Hatch's company, for the $78,000, and paid the invoice with a check to Vintage. [Id. at 
64; Def. Ex. 28.] No project was ever built on the Williams Property. [Tr. 8466 at 81.] 
Mr. Ellsworth further admitted that EPCO intended to exact payment of the 
$78,000 by means of the mechanic's lien on the Northshore Property. [R. 8466, Tr. at 
77-78.] Since EPCO was paying for Hubble's work on the Williams Property, EPCO 
could not claim a mechanics' lien under section 38-1-3 on the Northshore property. That 
work related to the Williams Property alone and thus provided no benefit at all to 51-
SPR's property. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law f^ f 2—5, 12; R. 8466, Tr. at 
61, 65, 66, 77-78, 261, 270-72. The Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he trial court 
explicitly found that Ellsworth paid the $78,000 to Hatch for work on the proposed 
development of a different piece of property, that it did not relate to Hatch's agreements 
with Mr. Chimento and SPR for the construction of Building I and Building II, and that 
Broadstone was responsible for repaying the amount to Ellsworth. Ellsworth has made 
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no earnest attempt on appeal to challenge the trial court's findings concerning the 
$78,000." Ellsworth Paulsen, 2006 UT App 353 at | 26. 
EPCO misses this point in its brief. The $78,000 that EPCO paid to Vintage had 
nothing to do with the Northshore project. This is not a case, like John Wagner & Assoc, 
v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1132 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), or Trench Shoring Svcs. v. 
Saratoga Springs Development, LLC, 57 P.3d 241,246, (Utah Ct. App. 2006), cited by 
EPCO, where the court held that recovery was permitted for buildings not attached to the 
actual property or for the value of rental equipment used in construction on the property. 
EPCO's Brief at 33-34. In Hercules, the Court found that the modular buildings were 
part of the realty that was liened. See 797 P.2d at 1131. Likewise, in Trench Shoring, it 
was undisputed that the equipment at issue was used on the construction project. See 
2002 UT App at 121. Here, in contrast, EPCO knew the $78,000 lien was based on a 
payment to Vintage for work that Hubble did on the Williams Property, and not for work 
provided by EPCO on 51-SPR's property. [Tr. 8466, Tr. at 85-86.] By giving an 
improper change order for the $78,000, Guy Hatch could not endow lien rights on EPCO 
that the legislature had not authorized. The trial court correctly so held. Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law at 7 Tf 12 (Add. F). 
EPCO attempts to downplay the fact that the trial court found that the $78,000 had 
nothing to do with the Northshore Project by asserting that "the money was allegedly to 
be used to pay for engineering costs on the project" and that Ellsworth "did not know if 
Hatch used the money for design work in the Northshore plaza, or indeed, if it was even 
paid to Hubble for design work at all." EPCO's Brief at 32 n.24, 33 n.25. What EPCO 
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fails to mention is that (1) the payment took place long before the development of 51-
SPR's property [Tr. 8466 at 78-80] (EPCO's check, Def. Ex. 28 (Add. I), is dated August 
27, 1999, which was approximately seven months before the construction contract for 
Building I and 12 months before the construction contract for Building II [Def. Exs. 3, 
4]); (2) Ellsworth "assumed" all along that the payment was for work performed on the 
Williams Property [Tr. 8466 at 61, 65, 66, 78]; and (3) the change order EPCO expected 
to receive was for a proposed building on the Williams Property [id. at 81]. As the Court 
of Appeals observed, "Ellsworth has made no earnest attempt on appeal to challenge the 
trial court's findings concerning the $ 78,000." Ellsworth Paulsen, 2006 UT App 353 at 
1f26.n 
Even if some criminal intent standard must be read into section 38-l-25(l)(b), the 
fact that EPCO recorded the $78,000 lien knowing that it was for work performed by 
another contractor on another piece of property satisfies that intent requirement. This 
Court should hold that the $78,000 lien was abusive since it was a payment made by 
EPCO to Vintage for work done by Hubble on the Williams Property, not on the 
Northshore Property. These facts were known to EPCO when it recorded the lien. That 
knowledge satisfied the intent requirement, whether based on a criminal standard or not. 
Even had EPCO challenged Finding No. 12 on appeal, it failed to marshal 
evidence supporting the finding before the Court of Appeals and has failed to do so in the 
present appeal. EPCO's attempt at marshaling—relegated to a footnote—is riddled with 
deficiencies. See EPCO's Brief at 33 n.25. EPCO fails even to identify any specific 
finding being challenged, and then merely reargues the evidence in its favor, ignoring an 
abundance of relevant evidence supporting the finding. 
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Based on these uncontroverted facts, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's holding that EPCO could not lien 51-SPR's property for the $78,000. Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law If 12; Ellsworth Paulsen. 2006 UT App 353, Tf1f 26-29. The 
Court of Appeals should have taken the next logical step of holding that the trial court's 
ruling that EPCO acted in good faith clearly was erroneous based on the lower court's 
findings and the uncontroverted evidence that EPCO recorded the $78,000 lien knowing 
that it did not represent any work that it or its subcontractors had done on the property 
that was the subject of its construction contract. Instead, the Court improperly held that 
the trial court's finding that EPCO acted in good faith was not clearly erroneous. 
Ellsworth Paulsen. 2006 UT App 353, t 34. 
Although the Court of Appeals asserted that its construction of the abusive lien 
statute "assures that the abusive lien statute continues cto discourage outrageous lien 
claims,'" Ellsworth Paulsen, 2006 UT App 353 at ^ 31 n. 14 (quoting J. Pochynok Co. v. 
Smedsrud. 2003 UT App 375, f 19, 80 P.3d 563, rev'd on other grounds. 2005 UT 39, 
116 P.3d 353), the contrary is true. If the $78,000 lien in this case—which was based on 
a payment by EPCO to Vintage for work done by Hubble on property that was never 
improved under the construction contract at issue—does not qualify for an abusive lien, it 
is doubtful that any lien recorded in Utah ever could qualify. The Court of Appeals' 
stringent limitations run counter to the purpose of the statute as articulated by this Court 
in A. K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guv. 2004 UT 47, If 24 & n.6, 94 P.3d 
270, and by the Court of Appeals in Pochynok. This Court should settle the issue, 
holding that the trial court's finding of good faith was clearly erroneous. 
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5. By Intentionally Filing a Lien Claim to Exact from 
51-SPR the $78,000—Which Was Not Due from 51-
SPR—EPCO Is Liable Under the Abusive Lien 
Statute, 
EPCO provides no legal basis for avoiding liability under the abusive lien 
statute. First, EPCO suggests that the statute requires "animus, scienter, or other mental 
culpability." EPCO's Brief at 28. This is not the case. As explained above, the statute 
does not condition liability on a lien claimant's subjective belief whether it is seeking 
more than is due, nor does it require a showing that the contractor specifically "intend" to 
exact more than is due. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25; 51-SPR's Brief at 39-43. 
EPCO's likening of the intent requirement of the abusive lien statute to the wrongful lien 
statute, EPCO's Brief at 32, only bolsters 51-SPR's position and defeats EPCO's flawed 
argument that all criminal liability must be premised on "animus" or "scienter," id. at 33-
34. A wrongful lien is defined as a document, unauthorized by statute, purporting to 
create a lien on real property. See id. § 38-9-1(6). Criminal liability merely requires a 
showing that the person "intentionally records" the wrongful lien, and not some 
subjective intent to harm the owner. Id. § 38-9-5(1), (2). Likewise, the abusive lien 
statute premises criminal liability (and in turn, a civil penalty) simply on the intentional 
filing of an abusive lien, and not on some proof of "animus." See id. § 38-1-25(1). 
EPCO can save for the legislature its argument that the statute should include something 
more. 
11 The Court should ignore EPCO's statement that its lien was "understated," 
EPCO's Brief at 28 n. 19, which has no support in the record. What matters is that the 
lien undisputedly contained a claim for the $78,000 it paid to Vintage. [Tr. 8466 at 77-
78.] 
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Second, EPCO suggests that "the intentional clouding title and unjustified 
advantage components of the statute" were not met. EPCO's Brief at 30. However, these 
requirements have no application to 51-SPR's abusive lien claim, which is premised only 
on subsection (l)(b) of section 38-1-25. 
Third, EPCO properly notes that trial court findings are reviewed for clear error, 
EPCO's Brief at 31, but neglects to show how 51-SPR failed in its marshaling burden. 
51-SPR has marshaled all evidence supporting the trial court's findings relating to the 
abusive lien, and has shown that those findings are clearly erroneous or, at minimum, 
immaterial. See 51-SPR's Brief at 37-45. EPCO fails to respond to 51-SPR's analysis. 
Fourth, it will not create a "chilling effect" on mechanics' lien claimants, as EPCO 
suggests, EPCO's Brief at 28-29, if EPCO is held liable for liening 51-SPR's property for 
$78,000 paid to Vintage for work performed by Hubble on the Williams Property. Nor 
will EPCO's liability mean that every time a contractor does not recover in a lien action 
all of the claimed amount, the difference would constitute an abusive lien. It is one thing 
for a lien claimant's accounting mistake to reduce its recovery at trial, but yet another for 
a lien claimant to file a lien "intentionally," within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 38-
1-25(1), for work done by someone else on property other than the property liened. 
B. The Court of Appeals Erred in Holding That the Words 
"More Than is Due" in Subsection (l)(b) Include a 
Contractual Indebtedness for Which the Contractor Has 
No Legal Lien Rights. 
The Court of Appeals also erred in its analysis of the meaning of the words "more 
than is due" in subsection (l)(b). The trial court's finding of good faith on the part of 
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EPCO in filing the $78,000 lien was based on a change order that Hatch executed on 
behalf of Broadstone, which constituted a contractual agreement that Broadstone would 
pay the $78,000: 
The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith in claiming the 
$78,000 based upon the instruction and direction given by Mr. Natch [sic] 
and Broadstone. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen's only intent in 
filing the lien was to ensure payment of the $78,000 it had given to Vintage 
Construction at the direction of Mr. Hatch, the owner of the property. The 
recording of the lien was done solely at the direction of Mr. Hatch to ensure 
that Ellsworth Paulsen would be reimbursed for the $78,000 it paid. At the 
time the $78,000 was paid, and at the time the lien was filed, Ellsworth 
Paulsen as a result of its conversations with Mr. Hatch, did not know how 
much of the $78,000 was used or would be applied to the construction of 
Buildings I and II. This Court finds that the lien was not intended to extract 
from the owner more than was due or procure an unjustified advantage, 
because the lien was filed for the amount to be reimbursed to Ellsworth 
Paulsen. 
Findings of Fact % 25 (Add. F). 
Like the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that the change order for $78,000 
provided a "contractual basis" for EPCO's subjective belief that that amount was "due" 
and, therefore, that EPCO's recording of the lien was not abusive—even though this 
amount had nothing to do with the subject property. The Court of Appeals stated: 
Ellsworth relied on Hatch's signed change order referencing the Northshore 
Property as providing a contractual basis under which it could include the 
$78,000 in its lien claim on the Northshore Property. While Ellsworth's reliance 
ultimately has proven to be incorrect, it at least provides evidence that tends to 
support the finding that Ellsworth included the amount based on what it thought 
was a legitimate and binding change order and did not intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly include the amount to exact more than was due. 
2006 UT App 353 at f^ 33 (emphasis supplied). The rule adopted by the Court of Appeals 
justifies the filing of a mechanic's lien to extract payment of a debt from a property 
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owner for which the contractor had no legal right to record a lien, as long as some other 
contractual basis existed.13 
This is not what the legislature intended. The amount that is "due" is the amount 
for which a lien can be claimed—not other contract obligations for which no lien rights 
are available. The word "due" appears three times in Section 38-1-25. The first sentence 
of the section refers to liens that contain a "greater demand than the sum due to be 
recorded or filed." Subsection (l)(b) refers to liens that exact "more than is due" and 
subsection (2)(a) allows damages based on the amount by which the wrongful lien 
"exceeds the amount actually due." Read together, these provisions limit the meaning of 
the term "more than is due" to the amount that can legitimately be the subject of a lien. 
Subsection (l)(b) does not refer to amounts due under other contracts for which there are 
no lien rights. 
Although no Utah appellate court has previously construed the "more than is due" 
language of section 38-l-25(l)(b), cases addressing the policies underlying the abusive 
lien statute support the analysis that this language does not give contractors a means to 
avoid liability by claiming that they have some contractual or other basis for payment. 
The Court of Appeals has recognized in another case that Senate Bill 167 before the 2001 
Utah Legislature, which included amendments to the abusive lien statute, was proposed 
13
 If the Court of Appeals' rule on the abusive lien issue were applied to its 
interesting hypothetical example—used to illustrate the basis for its denial of EPCO's 
$78,000 lien claim, 2006 UT App 353 at If 29 n. 12—the result would be to find that 
Catherine's mechanic's lien was not abusive even though the $500 was admittedly for 
skis and not for any improvements to the subject property, so long as Catherine had a 
change order signed by Brian for the $500, phony though it was. 
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"in an effort to curb wrongful, outrageous, and fraudulent lien claims." J. Pochynok Co. 
v. Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 375, ^ f 18, 80 P.3d 563 (rev'd on other grounds, 2005 UT 39, 
116 P.3d 353). In other words, "the intent of the amendment is to discourage outrageous 
lien claims." Id. at *f 19. Though it reversed the result, this Court did not disturb the 
Court of Appeals' interpretation of the purpose of the abusive lien statute. See L 
Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud, 2005 UT 39, Tf 16, 116 P.3d 353 (recognizing "clear 
legislative policy" to curb "wrongful, outrageous, and fraudulent lien claims"); see also 
id at til 17, 20; A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guv, 2004 UT 47, % 24, 94 
P.3d 270 (recognizing that statutory scheme, including section 38-1-25, "has the effect of 
discouraging abuse of the lien process by creating a strong disincentive for a would-be 
litigant to wrongly inflict a mechanic's lien on a property owner whose property was not 
actually enhanced"). 
Since the intent of section 38-1-25 is to bar abusive lien filings, it is reasonable to 
assume that, when it used the words "more than is due" in section 38-l-25(l)(b), the 
legislature intended to refer only to amounts due for which the contractor is entitled to 
record a mechanic's lien and not to other obligations, whether contractual or not. The 
fact that Hatch signed a change order for the $78,000 that may have contractually 
obligated Broadstone to pay EPCO did not justify EPCO's recording of the lien since 
EPCO knew when it recorded the lien that it had not performed any work on the subject 
property. A contractor cannot record a lien on property simply because he is owed 
money for some other non-lienable debt. Yet, this is what the Court of Appeals held. It 
held that, despite a specific finding that EPCO did not pay the $78,000 for the 
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improvement of the subject property, there was no problem with EPCO recording a lien 
in that amount because Hatch signed a change order. The execution of the change order 
did not justify the lien, as the Court of Appeals correctly held. That being the case, it 
could not be said that EPCO was simply attempting to collect what was "due." In fact, in 
the words of the statute, it was "more than [was] due." Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-25(l)(b). 
Having affirmed the finding that EPCO did no work on the property, the Court of 
Appeals erred in not reversing the finding that EPCO had no intent to exact more than 
was due under its construction contract for that property. Similarly, the Court should also 
have reversed the finding that EPCO did not intend to cloud the title to the property or to 
procure an unjustified advantage or benefit, within the meaning of section 38-l-25(l)(a) 
and (c). The fact that Hatch gave EPCO a change order for the $78,000 did not make that 
amount "due" any more than it entitled EPCO to file a lien for that amount. 
In its petition for certiorari, 51-SPR argued that the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding that the words "more than is due" in subsection 38-l-25(l)(b) include a 
contractual indebtedness for which the contractor has no legal lien rights. This is an issue 
of first impression. Instead of explaining why this issue is unimportant and undeserving 
of Supreme Court review, EPCO argues the merits. See EPCO's Brief at 14-16. 
EPCO's argument underscores the need for certiorari. This is an important question of 
state law that should be settled by the Supreme Court. 
Siding with the Court of Appeals on this issue, EPCO disagrees with 51-SPR's 
position that "a lien claimant can only lien for those items that actually improve the real 
property." EPCO's Brief at 35. EPCO states that under 51-SPR's interpretation of the 
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lien statute, a trial court would be required, when determining the validity of a lien claim, 
"to parse through any line items in a construction contract to make sure that all of the line 
items actually go into the ground, and reject all other portions of the contract as non-
lienable." EPCO's Brief at 34-35. 
Contrary to EPCO's assertions and the Court of Appeals' ruling, this is precisely 
what the mechanic's lien statute requires. Under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3, a contractor 
may lien only "the property upon or concerning which they have rendered service." If an 
amount invoiced by a contractor did not actually benefit the real property, no lien rights 
are available regardless of the fact that the contractor may have a contract claim against 
the owner. See Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982) ("The 
purpose of the mechanics' lien act is remedial in nature and seeks to provide protection to 
laborers and materialmen who have added directly to the value of the property of another 
by their materials or labor."); Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(lien disallowed for work done on another parcel than the one on which the lien was 
recorded). 
The Court of Appeals' opinion, while disallowing a lien for work done on the 
Williams Property, held that a lien supported by a contract right—in this case the 
$78,000 change order—did not seek "more than is due" even though the work did not 
benefit the property against which the lien was recorded. The Court should hold that 
EPCO recorded an abusive lien on 51-SPR's property to exact "more than is due." 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, 51-SPR respectfully requests that EPCO's Petition for 
Certiorari be denied, that 51-SPR's Cross-Petition for Certiorari be granted, and that the 
Court award such additional and further relief as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this ^Sciay'of February, 2007. 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
By: 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Erik A. Olson 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 90* 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)415-3000 
Attorneys for Respondent and Cross-Petitioner 
51-SPR-L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ -^ day of February, 2007,1 caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-
PETITIONER 51-SPR-L.L.C. to be mailed to the following: 
Mark L. Poulsen 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
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Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company, Plaintiff, Appellee, and 
Cross-appellant, v. 51-SPR, L.L.C., Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-
appellee. 
Case No. 20040507-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2006 UTApp 353; 144 P.3d 261; 559 Utah Adv. Rep. 14; 2006 Utah 
App. LEXIS 386 
August 31, 2006, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Writ of certiorari 
granted Paulsen Const v. 51-Spr-L, 2006 Utah 
LEXIS 228 (Utah, Dec. 14, 2006) 
PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] Fourth District, 
Provo Department, 010405059. The Honorable 
GaryD. Stott. 
COUNSEL: R.Stephen Marshall and Erik A. 
Olson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Poulsen and Bret Reich, Sandy, for 
Appellee. 
JUDGES: ORME, Judge. WE CONCUR: Ju-
dith M. Billings, Judge, Carolyn B. McHugh, 
Judge. 
OPINION BY: ORME 
OPINION: [**263] ORME, Judge: 
[*P1] This case arises from a real estate 
project gone bad. We have before us the appeal 
and cross-appeal from several aspects of the 
trial court's rulings. We reverse in part and af-
firm in part, and remand for additional proceed-
ings. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] Plaintiff Ellsworth Paulsen Con-
struction Company (Ellsworth) entered into two 
construction contracts with Guy Hatch and his 
company, Broadstone Investments, L.C. 
(Broadstone), under which Ellsworth agreed to 
act as general contractor for the construction of 
two commercial buildings (Building I and 
Building II) as part of a project in American 
Fork, Utah (the Northshore Property). [**264] 
51-SPR, L.L.C. (SPR), through its owner, 
Robert Chimento, entered into an agreement 
with Hatch and Broadstone (the Agreement), 
which provided, among [***2] other things, 
that SPR would contribute $ 2.9 million toward 
the purchase and development of the North-
shore Property and take title to the property as a 
tenant in common with Broadstone. Based on 
the Agreement and SPR's actions, the trial court 
ruled on a partial summary judgment motion 
that SPR and Broadstone were joint venturers 
in the development of the Northshore Property 
and, thus, that SPR shared liability on the con-
struction contracts Broadstone had entered into 
with Ellsworth. 
[*P3] Apparently, however, Ellsworth 
knew nothing about SPR's involvement in the 
project, having no direct dealings with SPR un-
til Hatch disappeared toward the end of con-
struction and Ellsworth sought payment on out-
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standing invoices that Hatch had left unpaid, nl 
Until that time, Ellsworth had dealt exclusively 
with Hatch as the owner of Broadstone, Broad-
stone being designated under the Agreement as 
the project manager in charge of supervising 
construction on the Northshore Property. 
nl According to SPR, Hatch left Utah 
for Hawaii, where he apparently remains 
to this day. 
[*P4] To fund the construction, Broad-
stone had entered into two separate construc-
tion loan arrangements with Central Bank, 
which Hatch and a co-member of Broadstone, 
Dan Parkinson, personally guarantied. Under 
the Agreement, Broadstone was "in charge of 
obtaining remaining needed construction fi-
nancing and institutional permanent financing." 
The Agreement also required that Broadstone 
was to "provide financing for needed construc-
tion monies for the office building[s] and re-
maining cash needs of the project" beyond 
SPR's $ 2.9 million investment. The Agreement 
also expressly provided that "Guy Hatch will 
guaranty such financing." 
[*P5] Prior to disappearing, and toward 
the end of construction on the Northshore 
Property, Hatch had become suspiciously slow 
in paying Ellsworth's invoices, apparently due 
to the fact that the construction loan funds were 
almost exhausted. At least according to SPR, 
Hatch had been drawing on the construction 
loan funds and using them in other projects un-
related to the Northshore Property. Despite not 
being paid, Ellsworth continued its work. To-
ward the end of the project, with the construc-
tion loan funds apparently exhausted and Hatch 
having [***4] disappeared, Ellsworth had no-
where to send its final three draw requests. 
[*P6] Throughout the earlier course of 
construction, Ellsworth would submit draw re-
quests to Central Bank either directly or 
through Hatch. Once the draws were approved, 
Central Bank would then issue checks to Ells-
worth for its work and for the work of its sub-
contractors. Each check bore a lien waiver pro-
vision on the reverse side of the instrument. n2 
The trial court ruled on summary judgment that 
the lien waivers were valid and enforceable, 
and therefore cut off any lien rights through the 
date of each draw request, which is the date the 
draw was requested and not the date the check 
was received or cashed. In considering a subse-
quent motion for summary judgment, however, 
the trial court ruled that the indemnity provi-
sion within the lien waivers was inapplicable, 
invalid, and unenforceable, and that Ellsworth 
was not responsible to indemnify SPR against 
any subcontractor claims. 
n2 The lien waiver provisions read, in 
pertinent part: 
In consideration of payment 
of this check, payee by ne-
gotiating this check waives, 
releases, and relinquishes all 
right of lien or claims payee 
may have up to the date of 
the draw request described 
on the reverse side hereof 
(the "Draw Date"), upon the 
property described on the 
reverse side hereof (the 
"Property"). The payee certi-
fies that this check is pay-
ment for labor and materials 
that were actually performed 
upon and furnished to the 
Property. Payee warrants 
and guarantees under penalty 
of fraud that payment in full 
has been made by payee to 
the suppliers of all labor and 
materials to the Property in-
curred up to the Draw Date 
at the insistence of payee. 
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Payee agrees to indemnify 
and hold harmless the owner 
of the Property and Central 
Bank or its assigns, from any 
loss, claims, or expenses in-
curred by them by reason of 
or rising out of any liens or 
claims made against the 
Property by any supplier of 
labor [or] material at the in-
sistence of payee. 
[***5] 
[**265] [*P7] After Hatch disappeared 
and the loan funds were exhausted, Ellsworth 
learned of SPR's involvement in the project and 
approached SPR directly for payment for the 
completed work. SPR, viewing itself as a mere 
investor or limited partner, disclaimed any ob-
ligation to pay Ellsworth or its subcontractors. 
n3 Ellsworth then filed a mechanic's lien 
against Building I and Building II, and com-
menced this action to foreclose the lien. n4 Af-
ter initially ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment that there was a question of fact con-
cerning whether Ellsworth's lien had been 
timely filed, the trial court reconsidered its rul-
ing and concluded that the mechanic's lien was 
timely filed and otherwise valid. Also on sum-
mary judgment, the trial court dismissed Ells-
worth's claim that SPR failed to obtain a pay-
ment bond. 
n3 Shortly before Hatch disappeared, 
SPR learned of Hatch's purported misuse 
of the Northshore Property construction 
funds, SPR confronted Hatch, and Hatch 
agreed to relinquish to SPR Broadstone's 
one-half interest in the property. By the 
time SPR assumed control of the North-
shore Property, Broadstone had defaulted 
on the two construction loans. 
[***6] 
n4 Several of Ellsworth's subcontrac-
tors also filed mechanics' liens and the 
trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the subcontractors who had filed 
liens. To avoid foreclosure of those liens, 
SPR apparently paid those claims, leav-
ing only Ellsworth's lien and contract 
claims remaining to be resolved. Thus, 
this appeal involves only Ellsworth's 
claims against SPR. 
[*P8] Ellsworth brought additional claims 
against Hatch and Broadstone for, among other 
things, failure to pay amounts due under two 
construction contracts entered into pursuant to 
the Agreement. Ellsworth brought those same 
claims against SPR on the theory that SPR was 
in a joint venture relationship with Hatch and 
Broadstone in the development of the North-
shore Property. SPR defended against these 
claims by initiating, in a separate proceeding 
which was later consolidated into this lawsuit, 
an action to quiet title in Building I and Build-
ing II. SPR also brought claims against Ells-
worth under Utah's abusive lien statute, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25 (2005), for includ-
ing in its lien claim [***7] $ 78,000 that SPR 
asserted was attributable to an unrelated project 
on which Hatch and Ellsworth were collaborat-
ing without SPR's involvement. 
[*P9] A three-day bench trial was held on 
the issues not previously decided on summary 
judgment. At the conclusion of the trial, the 
court ruled in Ellsworth's favor on its lien and 
breach of contract claims in the amount of just 
over $ 721,000. Although it disallowed the 
claim for $ 78,000, the trial court denied SPR's 
related abusive lien argument, holding that 
Ellsworth had acted in good faith in including 
the $ 78,000 in its lien claim and had not in-
tended to exact more from SPR than was due. 
The trial court also granted Ellsworth attorney 
fees as the prevailing party under the lien stat-
ute, but refused to award Ellsworth pre-
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judgment contractual interest on its final three 
draws because Ellsworth never submitted those 
final draws and, thus, the court could not fix a 
date at which the contract was breached and 
from which interest began to accrue. Both sides 
now appeal various aspects of the trial court's 
resolution of this complicated dispute. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Joint Venture Ruling 
[*P10] SPR argues that the trial court 
erred in [***8] concluding, on partial sum-
mary judgment, that it was in a joint venture 
relationship with Broadstone and Hatch. Spe-
cifically, SPR attacks the trial court's conclu-
sion that SPR had a duty to share in the losses 
of the Northshore Property. Because there is a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding the key 
issue of whether SPR agreed to share losses 
with Broadstone and Hatch, we reverse the trial 
court's partial summary judgment ruling. 
[*P11] The "duty to share in any losses" is 
one of the elements of a joint venture relation-
ship that the Utah Supreme Court has deemed 
to be "essential" to the existence of such a rela-
tionship. Bus sett v. Baker, 530 P. 2d 1, 2 (Utah 
1974). n5 See also Betenson v. [**266] Call 
Auto & Equip. Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684, 686 
(Utah 1982). It goes without saying that a duty 
to share losses is present in a relationship 
where a "written agreement specifically pro-
vide^] for the sharing of losses." Harline v. 
Campbell, 728 P.2d 980, 983 (Utah 1986). 
Likewise, where the sharing of losses is "spe-
cifically excluded by [an] agreement," no duty 
to share losses can be found to support a con-
clusion that parties are in [***9] a joint ven-
ture relationship. Betenson, 645 P.2d at 686. 
Where, however, an agreement fails to specifi-
cally provide for or exclude a duty to share 
losses-which we conclude is true of the 
Agreement in this case-courts are faced with a 
more difficult determination. 
n5 The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated the "essential" elements of the 
joint venture relationship as follows: 
The parties must combine 
their property, money, ef-
fects, skill, labor and knowl-
edge. As a general rule, there 
must be a community of in-
terest in the performance of 
the common purpose, a joint 
proprietary interest in the 
subject matter, a mutual 
right to control, a right to 
share in the profits, and 
unless there is an agreement 
to the contrary, a duty to 
share in any losses which 
may be sustained. 
Bassett v. Baker, 530 P. 2d 1, 2 (Utah 
1974). The trial court concluded on 
summary judgment that all the other es-
sential elements were also present in the 
relationship between SPR and Broad-
stone, a conclusion SPR does not dispute 
on appeal. 
[***10] 
[*P12] Ellsworth argues that in such in-
stances a duty to share losses may be inferred 
from an agreement or from the nature of the 
parties' relationship, especially when all the 
other elements of a joint venture relationship 
are present. While the Utah Supreme Court has 
indicated that "the agreement to share losses 
need not necessarily be stated in specific terms 
. . . to permit [a] court to infer that the parties 
intend[ed] to share losses as well as profits," 
Bassett, 530 P.2d at 2, Utah case law does not 
appear to support the notion advanced by Ells-
worth that Utah courts have routinely made 
such an inference on summary judgment. In-
stead, "any doubt concerning questions of fact, 
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including evidence and reasonable inferences 
drawn from the evidence, should be resolved in 
favor of the [party opposing summary judg-
ment]." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick 
Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah Ct App. 1989). 
Inferring on summary judgment a duty to share 
losses runs counter to this precept. n6 
n6 It appears, then, that in most in-
stances where there is no express agree-
ment between parties concerning the 
sharing of losses, the question of whether 
one has a duty to share in losses will or-
dinarily be a question of fact—just as the 
overarching question of "[w]hether a 
joint venture exists is ordinarily a ques-
tion of fact," Strand v. Cranney, 607 
P.2d 295, 296 (Utah 7PS0>-because the 
joint venture relationship itself "does not 
always arise pursuant to formal agree-
ment." Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co., 738 
P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1987). Of course, 
where the facts are truly not in dispute, 
the duty to share losses, or the existence 
of a joint venture for that matter, may be 
determined as a matter of law. See Bas-
sett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1974). 
[*P13] The trial court concluded that 
"[t]he terms of the Agreement, SPR's owner-
ship interest in the Project, and SPR's undis-
puted actions all gave rise to SPR's duty to 
share in any losses which may be sustained by 
the Project." Ellsworth argues that the trial 
court properly inferred from the Agreement, 
SPR's undisputed actions, and the other undis-
puted facts that SPR had the duty to share in 
losses. We disagree because when "we view the 
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn there-
from in the light most favorable to [SPR]," 
there is a genuine dispute of fact on a material 
issue, which precludes summary judgment. 
Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 
2000 UT 71, P15, 10 P.3d 338. See also Bee-
hive, 780P.2dat832. 
[*P14] '"A genuine issue of fact exists 
where, on the basis of the facts in the record, 
reasonable minds could differ' on any material 
issue." Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 
P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). 
Here, on the material issue of whether SPR had 
a duty to share losses, a genuine issue of fact 
arises out of reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from a combination of [***12] the 
Agreement itself; the affidavit testimony of 
Robert Chimento, the owner of SPR; and other 
undisputed facts before the court. 
[*P15] Although the trial court regarded 
Chimento's affidavit testimony as nothing more 
than "bald assertions" and "conclusory allega-
tions" that did not "create any genuine issue of 
material fact" because they were "sharply con-
tradicted by both the terms of the Agreement 
and the undisputed facts," we conclude that 
Chimento's affidavit did create an issue of fact 
concerning the duty to share losses. Indeed, 
when Chimento's affidavit testimony is viewed 
together with the Agreement's [**267] provi-
sions, several of the provisions, rather than 
"sharply contradict[ing]" his testimony, actu-
ally lend credence to his assertions and give 
rise to reasonable inferences favorable to SPR's 
position. 
[*P16] Chimento's affidavit asserts that 
under the Agreement the parties intended to 
make Hatch and Broadstone solely responsible 
for "all expenses, costs, losses, and risks asso-
ciated with the Northshore project" and did not 
intend to make SPR liable for any losses, li-
abilities, or responsibilities, meaning that SPR 
stood only to lose its capital investment in the 
[***13] Northshore Property. The provisions 
in the Agreement that expressly release SPR 
from all obligations arising by way of any note 
or guaranty for construction financing and in-
stead place the sole obligation of obtaining and 
repaying construction financing and other cash 
needs of the project on Broadstone and Hatch, 
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at the very least give rise to the inference that 
SPR did not agree to share in other financial 
obligations, i.e., the net operating losses of the 
Northshore Property. Additionally, the Agree-
ment's terms guarantying SPR "a 10% return on 
its capital commencing December 1, 2000," 
with Broadstone and Hatch guarantying to even 
"contribute any and all sums to the project 
needed for payment of such return," support 
Chimento's affidavit and the inference that even 
if the project lost money, Broadstone alone 
bore the responsibility to contribute funds to 
cover the losses and to ensure that SPR, as an 
investor, received its guarantied return. 
[*P17] Other terms of the Agreement that 
the trial court interpreted as having "essentially 
put SPR's $ 2.9 million immediately at risk 
should the venture completely fail" and making 
"SPR one-half owner of a tenancy in common 
with all the [***14] accompanying liabilities 
of a real property owner," when viewed in their 
proper light on summary judgment, together 
with Chimento's affidavit, also give rise to 
equally plausible inferences that contradict the 
trial court's conclusion that SPR agreed to share 
in the losses of the project. n7 In addition, 
SPR's "undisputed actions" on which the trial 
court relied to conclude SPR was not acting as 
a mere investor—i.e., "when it agreed with Cen-
tral Bank in April, 2002 to guarantee 'Broad-
stone's' [$ ]4.3 million construction loans" and 
when it "voluntarily conveyed the Project prop-
erty to Broadstone for one day in January 2001 
so that Broadstone could secure additional fi-
nancing for the Project" n8 —when viewed in 
the light most favorable to SPR, also support 
the assertion that SPR may not have agreed to 
share in losses. 
n7 For example, the fact that SPR's 
capital investment was put at risk by the 
Agreement quite reasonably supports the 
inference that SPR, like any investor, 
stood only to lose its investment and 
nothing more if the project failed. More-
over, much like in the realm of partner-
ships, holding property as tenants in 
common does not by itself establish a 
joint venture relationship. Cf. Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-1-4(2) (2002) ("Joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, tenancy by entire-
ties, joint property, common property, or 
part ownership does not of itself establish 
a partnership, whether such co-owners do 
or do not share any profits made by the 
use of the property."). 
[***15] 
n8 The trial court inferred from these 
actions that "[SPR] voluntarily put its 
own property at greater risk of loss" than 
would an "investor" or "simple creditor," 
and that SPR had thereby waived the pro-
tection of language in the Agreement 
limiting SPR's obligation arising by rea-
son of any note or guaranty for construc-
tion financing. The court concluded that 
these actions manifested SPR's duty to 
share in losses. But it is equally plausible 
to infer from such actions that SPR was 
merely acting to protect its investment— 
and the potential return on its invest-
ment—by seeking to avoid foreclosure of 
the construction loans. Moreover, by 
mortgaging its interest in the Northshore 
Property, SPR did put the property at 
risk, but arguably only stood to lose its 
capital investment—which was used to 
purchase the property in the first place-
and nothing more. 
[*P18] While we do not suggest that the 
inferences the trial court drew from the Agree-
ment and other evidence before it are necessar-
ily incorrect, the fact that there are other 
equally plausible inferences to be drawn from 
the evidence manifests [***16] that summary 
judgment should not have been granted. See 
Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, PI8, 44 
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P. 3d 704 (Wilkins, J., concurring in the result) 
("Where, as here, equally plausible contrary 
inferences may be drawn, neither party should 
have been granted summary judgment."). In-
deed, 
[a] party opposing the motion is 
required only to show that there is 
a material issue [**268] of fact. 
Affidavits and depositions submit-
ted in support of and in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment 
may be used only to determine 
whether a material issue of fact ex-
ists, not to determine whether one 
party's case is less persuasive than 
another's or is not likely to succeed 
in a trial on the merits. 
Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 
926, 928 (Utah 1993). We therefore reverse the 
trial court's judgment on this issue and remand 
for a determination by the fact finder whether 
SPR had a duty to share in the losses of the pro-
ject. n9 
n9 SPR would have us rule as a mat-
ter of law that it had no duty to share in 
the losses and was therefore not a joint 
venturer with Broadstone. Even if we 
were to agree that the affidavits and un-
disputed facts entitled SPR to that con-
clusion as a matter of law—which we do 
not—SPR did not file a cross-motion for 
summary judgment, and we would there-
fore be procedurally constrained from en-
tering judgment in its favor on this issue 
in any event. 
II. Timeliness of Ellsworth's Mechanic's 
Lien 
[*P19] SPR argues that the trial court 
erred when it determined on summary judg-
ment that Ellsworth's mechanic's lien was 
timely filed on November 16, 2001. Specifi-
cally, SPR claims the trial court erred in con-
cluding that there was nontrivial, substantial 
work performed on Building I and Building II 
in September 2001 and October 2001 at "the 
request of Broadstone and/or SPR" and that the 
ninety-day filing period did not begin to run 
until that work was completed. SPR asserts that 
there were, on the record before the court, 
genuine issues of material fact concerning 
whether the Building I contract was completed 
by May 2001, whether the Building II contract 
was completed by July 2001, and whether any 
work performed after these dates fell within the 
scope of the original building contracts and was 
substantial enough to preclude the start of the 
ninety-day filing period. Likewise, SPR con-
tends there is a question of material fact con-
cerning when the owner's acceptance of Ells-
worth's work occurred. We agree with SPR that 
summary judgment on these issues was also 
improperly granted. 
[*P20] "Utah courts have articulated a 
two-prong [***18] test" for determining 
whether a mechanic's lien has been timely filed. 
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander 
& Smith Assocs., 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). Under the two-part test, "comple-
tion," as it appears in the applicable statute, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(l)(a) (2005), occurs 
when (1) the work under the contract "has been 
'substantially completed,' leaving only minor or 
trivial work to be accomplished," and (2) the 
work '"has been accepted by the owner."' Inte-
riors, 827 P.2d at 965 (citations omitted). "The 
decision as to whether the work at issue is sub-
stantial or trivial is fact sensitive," id. at 966, 
and "generally it is for the trier of fact to de-
termine whether the additional work was trivial 
or minor." Carlisle v. Cox, 29 Utah 2d 136, 506 
P.2d 60, 62 (1973). Likewise, the question of 
owner acceptance is often fact dependent, espe-
cially where the owner is alleged to have with-
Page 8 
2006 UT App 353, *; 144 P.3d 261, **; 
559 Utah Adv. Rep. 14; 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 386, *** 
held acceptance until certain remaining items 
of work were completed. See Interiors, 827 
P. 2d at 967-69. Of course, if the record is clear 
and the facts are undisputed, [***19] those 
questions may be determined as a matter of 
law. See Carlisle, 506 P.2d at 62. Such, how-
ever, is not the case here. 
[*P21] While it appears to be undisputed 
that some work continued on Building I and 
Building II after May 2001 and July 2001, re-
spectively, both parties presented evidence on 
summary judgment that supported conflicting 
completion dates and cast doubt on the scope of 
the work performed on or after August 15, 
2001—ninety days before Ellsworth filed its 
mechanic's lien. When we view all of the facts 
and reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
from in the light most favorable to SPR's posi-
tion, see Surety Underwriters v. E & C Truck-
ing, 2000 UT 71, P15, 10 P.3d 338; Beehive 
Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 
831 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), we conclude that 
there is a dispute of fact concerning (1) the date 
the buildings were completed, (2) the nature 
and scope of work performed on Building I af-
ter May 2001 and on Building II after July 
2001, and (3) when owner acceptance occurred. 
[*P22] The fact that SPR can point to 
documents wherein Ellsworth certified that the 
[**269] entire Building I contract was 100% 
[***20] complete in May 2001 and that a sub-
contract was 100% complete in March 2001-
the same subcontract on which Ellsworth relies 
to contend that work was still being performed 
on Building I as late as September 2001— 
adequately puts into dispute Ellsworth's "living, 
breathing witness testimony" that "extensive 
work after the dates of substantial completion" 
and "after the date of [Ellsworth's] invoices" 
was performed pursuant to the original con-
tract. It also raises questions about the nature 
and triviality of work performed on Building I 
after those dates. Moreover, SPR raises a genu-
ine issue of material fact regarding the substan-
tial or trivial nature of the work performed on 
Building I when any work performed after May 
2001 is considered in light of the total contract 
price. See Interiors, 827 P.2d at 967 (approv-
ing trial court's conclusion that substantial 
completion had occurred where work per-
formed after the completion date had a de 
minimis dollar value in comparison to the total 
contract price); Carlisle, 506 P.2d at 62 (same). 
[*P23] hi addition, evidence that Ells-
worth certified that the Building II contract was 
100% complete in July 2001 [***21] and that 
its subcontractors' invoices reflecting that they 
had completed all their work by July 2001-
even though the same subcontractors performed 
more work on Building II after July 2001-
raises a genuine issue of material fact concern-
ing when substantial completion occurred. This 
determination is especially unclear in light of 
evidence SPR advanced to show the minimal 
value of the work performed after July 2001. 
[*P24] Ellsworth asserts that SPR's con-
tentions should fail "in the face of compelling— 
if not overwhelming—evidence that contravenes 
[SPR's] conclusory contentions" and "in the 
face of extensive testimony by subcontractors 
and [Ellsworth] that they were all performing 
thousands-perhaps tens of thousands-of dol-
lars of work on the project during the months of 
August, September and October." Ellsworth's 
assertions are unavailing, however, since sum-
mary judgment cannot be granted based on the 
credibility and weight of the parties' respective 
evidence. See Lamb v. B & B Amusements 
Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) (stating 
that the evidence presented on summary judg-
ment "may be used only to determine whether a 
material issue of fact exists, not [***22] to de-
termine whether one party's case is less persua-
sive than another's or is not likely to succeed in 
a trial on the merits"). nlO On the contrary, 
"[t]rial courts must avoid weighing evidence 
and assessing credibility when ruling on mo-
tions for summary judgment." n i l Trujillo v. 
Utah Dep't ofTransp., 1999 UT App 227, P42, 
986 P.2d 752. As noted above, to oppose a mo-
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tion for summary judgment a party "is required 
only to show that there is a material issue of 
fact," and not to show that "one party's case is 
less persuasive than another's or is not likely to 
succeed in a trial on the merits." Lamb, 869 
P. 2d at 928. We therefore reverse the court's 
judgment on this issue and remand for appro-
priate reconsideration of the issue of lien time-
liness. 
nlO This familiar pronouncement is 
contrary to a startling statement by Pro-
fessor David A. Thomas that a Utah Su-
preme Court case, McBride v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 431 (Utah 1980), supports the 
proposition that "[e]ven if the averments 
of the parties are in disagreement, sum-
mary judgment can be granted based on 
the credibility of the parties' respective 
evidence." David A. Thomas, Utah Civil 
Practice § 8.14[5][c][i], at 8-102 (2005). 
But the Supreme Court's treatment of the 
trial court's grant of summary dismissal 
in McBride actually stands for quite the 
opposite proposition. See 615 P.2d at 
432-34. 
ni l The trial court's summary judg-
ment ruling includes "Findings" that, in-
deed, appear to be true findings of fact 
reached by weighing evidence and as-
sessing credibility rather than the mis-
nomer we often see employed in a writ-
ten ruling on summary judgment, where 
what is really a recitation of undisputed 
facts will appear under the heading 
"Findings." 
III. Ellsworth's Inclusion of $ 78,000 in its 
Lien Claim 
[*P25] Both parties appeal the trial court's 
ruling concerning $ 78,000 Ellsworth included 
in its lien claim. Ellsworth contends that since 
it was entitled to claim the $ 78,000 as part of 
its lien claim, the [**270] trial court erred in 
not awarding the $ 78,000 as part of its lien and 
contract claims. SPR contends that the trial 
court erred in not holding Ellsworth liable un-
der Utah's abusive lien statute for including the 
$ 78,000 in its lien claim on the Northshore 
Property for work performed on an unrelated 
piece of property. We take up each contention 
in turn. 
A. Ellsworth's claim to the $ 78,000 
[*P26] Ellsworth argues that the trial court 
erred by not holding SPR liable to pay [***24] 
Ellsworth the $ 78,000, advancing several theo-
ries on appeal in support of its contention. We 
conclude, however, that the trial court was cor-
rect. Given the trial court's findings and conclu-
sions, Ellsworth is not entitled to recover the $ 
78,000 under any of the theories advanced. The 
trial court explicitly found that Ellsworth paid 
the $ 78,000 to Hatch for work on the proposed 
development of a different piece of property, 
that it did not relate to Hatch's agreements with 
Mr. Chimento and SPR for the construction of 
Building I and Building II, and that Broadstone 
was responsible for repaying the amount to 
Ellsworth. Ellsworth has made no earnest at-
tempt on appeal to challenge the trial court's 
findings concerning the $ 78,000. See Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, PI9, 100 P.3d 1177 ("In 
order to establish that a particular finding of 
fact is clearly erroneous, '[a]n appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, 
the trial court's findings are so lacking in sup-
port as to be against the clear weight of the evi-
dence.'") (citation omitted). 
[*P27] The plain language of the Mechan-
ics' Liens statute makes [***25] clear that 
Ellsworth was only entitled to record or file a 
"lien upon the property upon or concerning 
which [it has] rendered service, performed la-
bor, or furnished or rented materials or equip-
ment for the value of the service rendered, la-
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bor performed, or materials or equipment fur-
nished or rented." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 
(2005). Although Ellsworth would be entitled 
to file a lien for services rendered even if the 
planned development never occured, the lien 
must nevertheless be filed against "the property 
concerning which [it] has rendered professional 
service." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Carlson, 23 
Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387, 388 (1970). Given 
that the trial court found the $ 78,000 was not 
related to the Northshore Property, but rather to 
another of Hatch's projects, Ellsworth was not 
entitled to include the $ 78,000 as part of its 
lien on the Northshore Property. 
[*P28] Ellsworth insists, however, that the 
trial court's findings do not prevent the conclu-
sion that when Hatch signed a change order 
indicating that the $ 78,000 was to be part of 
the Building II contract, Hatch made the $ 
78,000 a "partnership" debt, for which SPR 
[***26] should be equally responsible. But 
even assuming that a joint venture existed be-
tween Hatch and SPR, the trial court's findings 
prevent imposing liability on SPR for the 
change order. 
[*P29] It is true that "[e]very partner is an 
agent of the partnership for the purpose of its 
business, and the act of every partner . . . binds 
the partnership," Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6(1) 
(2002), but that binding authority does not ex-
tend to "[a]n act of a partner which is not ap-
parently for the carrying on of the business of 
the partnership in the usual way." Id. § 48-1-
6(2). The business of this alleged partnership or 
joint venture was the development of the 
Northshore Property. And the findings are clear 
that the $ 78,000 was unrelated to the North-
shore Property and not part of the Agreement 
between Hatch and SPR. By the trial court's 
findings, then, the $ 78,000 was for use on an-
other of Hatch's own business undertakings, 
completely unrelated to the Northshore Prop-
erty. Absent some showing that the trial court's 
findings in this regard were incorrect and ab-
sent an affirmative finding that the $ 78,000 
was indeed related to the business of this al-
leged partnership, [***27] Hatch's act of sign-
ing a change order in an apparent attempt to 
make his unrelated obligation part of the part-
nership business has no binding effect on SPR 
under partnership law. nl2 See id. We [**271] 
therefore decline to disturb the trial court's 
findings and conclusions concerning Ells-
worth's inclusion of this $ 78,000 in its lien 
claim. 
nl2 A more simplistic example may 
help to explain our analysis: Aimee and 
Brian form a partnership in order to pur-
chase and develop property into a strip 
mall. Aimee and Brian contract with 
general contractor Catherine to develop 
the land. Construction progresses as ex-
pected with Aimee and Brian signing 
various change orders throughout the 
project. During the construction, Brian 
offers to buy a pair of skis that he notices 
on Catherine's truck. Catherine is willing 
to sell them, and she and Brian decide on 
a price of $ 500. Brian, a little short on 
cash, memorializes the deal on a change 
order form, assuring Catherine she will 
be paid in due course. Toward the end of 
construction, Brian loots the remaining 
construction loan funds and absconds to 
Venezuela, taking with him the skis for 
which he never paid. Aimee is unable to 
pay the outstanding draw requests and 
Catherine files a mechanic's lien on the 
property and institutes a breach of con-
tract action and an action to foreclose the 
lien. Catherine includes the $ 500 change 
order amount for the skis in her lien 
claim and also seeks recovery of the $ 
500 from Aimee as a partnership debt. 
Clearly, Catherine is not entitled to re-
cover the $ 500 as part of her lien or 
from Aimee as a partnership debt. Al-
though a little more involved than the 
simple purchase of a pair of skis for $ 
500, the situation is essentially the same 
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here given the trial court's unchallenged 
findings. 
[***28] 
B. Violation of Utah's Abusive Lien Statute 
[*P30] The question remains whether the 
trial court properly concluded that Ellsworth 
did not violate Utah's abusive lien statute by 
including $ 78,000 as part of its lien claim 
when the trial court ultimately held that Ells-
worth was not entitled to do so. The trial court 
concluded that although Ellsworth was not enti-
tled to include the $ 78,000 amount in its lien 
claim, it "acted in good faith in claiming the $ 
78,000." The court found that Ellsworth had 
filed the lien pursuant to Hatch's change order 
and Hatch's instructions, and that Ellsworth did 
not cause the lien to be filed with an intent to 
cloud the title of the property, to exact more 
than it believed was due, or to procure an un-
justified advantage. SPR contends the abusive 
lien statute does not condition liability on a lien 
claimant's subjective belief that it is seeking 
more than is due and does not require a show-
ing that the lien claimant specifically intended 
to exact more than is due. Thus, SPR contends 
that Ellsworth should have been penalized un-
der the abusive lien statute for including $ 
78,000 more in its lien claim than it was legiti-
mately owed for work on the Northshore 
[***29] Property. We disagree. 
[*P31] The abusive lien statute provides 
that "[a]ny person entitled to record or file a 
lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim 
of lien against any property, which contains a 
greater demand than the sum due to be re-
corded or filed" and the person does so "(a) 
with the intent to cloud the title; (b) to exact 
from the owner or person liable by means of 
the excessive claim of lien more than is due; or 
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or 
benefit." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-25(1) (2005). 
nl3 The statute is peculiarly phrased, in that 
while the language of subsection (1) provides 
that the lien claimant must intentionally cause a 
lien to be filed that demands more that the lien 
claimant is due, one of the subsections provides 
a further requirement concerning mental state 
while the other two do not. Thus, subsection 
(l)(a) speaks of "the intent to cloud the title," 
while subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c) do not fur-
ther prescribe what culpable mental state the 
lien claimant must have with respect to filing 
the lien "to exact . . . more than is due" or "to 
procure any unjustified [***30] advantage or 
benefit." Id. But the abusive lien statute is a 
criminal statute and it does not "clearly indi-
cate[] a legislative purpose" to impose strict 
liability for the crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
102 (2003). As a result, the default culpable 
mental state of "intent, knowledge, or reckless-
ness shall suffice to establish criminal respon-
sibility" under the last two variants of the abu-
sive lien statute. nl4 Id. 
nl3 Besides the bite the criminal 
penalty puts into the abusive lien statute, 
a person who violates the statute is also 
liable "to the owner of the property or an 
original contractor or subcontractor who 
is affected by the lien for the greater of 
double the amount by which the lien ex-
ceeds what is actually due, or the actual 
damages incurred. Utah Code Ann. § 38-
1-25(2) (2005). 
nl4 Construing the abusive lien stat-
ute in this manner comports with the 
"fair import" of the statute's terms and 
"the objects of the law." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-106 (2003). Moreover, it assures 
that the abusive lien statute continues "to 
discourage outrageous lien claims," J. 
Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud, 2003 UT App 
375, P19, 80 P.3d 563, rev'd on other 
grounds, 2005 UT 39, 116 P.3d 353, and 
"abuse of the lien process by creating a 
strong disincentive for a would-be liti-
gant to wrongly inflict a mechanic's lien 
Page 12 
2006 UT App 353, *; 144 P.3d 261, **; 
559 Utah Adv. Rep. 14; 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 386, *** 
on a property owner whose property was 
not actually enhanced," A.K. & R. 
Wlupple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 
2004 UT 47, P24, 94 R3d 270, without 
chilling a legitimate lien claimant's right 
to file a mechanic's lien for any amount 
that may be due. Thus, lien claimants 
need to be wary of using the mechanic's 
lien process to intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly seek more than they are 
due, or to push some other abusive ad-
vantage. But where a lien proves to have 
been overstated for some other reason 
that does not violate the abusive lien 
statute, claimants need not fear the 
criminal liability or civil penalties the 
statute imposes. 
[***31] 
[**272] [*P32] The trial court specifi-
cally found that Ellsworth "did not cause the 
lien to be filed with the intent to cloud the 
property to exact more than it believed was due 
or procure an unjustified advantage." Although 
SPR contends that this finding is immaterial 
because the abusive lien statute does not re-
quire a showing of an intent "to exact . . . by 
means of the excessive claim of lien more than 
is due," Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-25(l)(b), given 
our application of the default culpable mental 
state as explained above, the finding is perti-
nent to the trial court's holding. Despite SPR's 
thorough efforts to marshal the evidence and 
challenge several of the trial court's findings, 
SPR has not established that these findings are 
clearly erroneous. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 
UT82, PI 9, 100 P. 3d 1177. Although SPR as-
serts that its difficultly in marshaling the evi-
dence supporting a finding of no intent typifies 
the problem inherent in proving a negative, 
SPR has ignored evidence that supports the in-
ference that Ellsworth did not intentionally, or 
even recklessly, include the $ 78,000 to exact 
more than it believed it was due. 
[*P33] [***32] Ellsworth relied on 
Hatch's signed change order referencing the 
Northshore Property as providing a contractual 
basis under which it could include the $ 78,000 
in its lien claim on the Northshore Property. 
While Ellsworth's reliance ultimately has 
proven to be incorrect, it at least provides evi-
dence that tends to support the finding that 
Ellsworth included the amount based on what it 
thought was a legitimate and binding change 
order and did not intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly include the amount to exact more 
than was due. 
[*P34] Although SPR points to other evi-
dence giving rise to inferences about what 
Ellsworth knew or did not know about the $ 
78,000, we are not convinced that the trial 
court's finding was clearly erroneous. Thus, 
although Ellsworth "intentionally cause[d] a 
claim of lien . . . which contained] a greater 
demand than the sum due to be recorded or 
filed," it did not do so with the requisite culpa-
ble mental state to cloud the title, to exact from 
the owner more than was due, or to procure 
some other unjustified advantage. 
IV. Lien Waivers 
[*P35] We next consider two aspects of 
the applicability of the lien waivers at issue in 
this case. With [***33] respect to both, we re-
mand for further consideration. 
A. Application of Lien Waivers 
[*P36] SPR argues that the trial court 
erred by ultimately not applying the lien waiv-
ers after correctly concluding before trial that 
the lien waivers were valid and enforceable. 
nl5 We admit we are slightly puzzled by the 
trial court's handling of the lien waiver issue, 
especially since neither party points us to a 
clear finding or explanation concerning why 
none of the lien waivers, held to be valid and 
enforceable in the abstract, were made applica-
ble by the trial court. Indeed, both sides assert 
different draw dates that are supposed to have 
cut off Ellsworth's lien rights for work per-
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formed prior to those dates. SPR asserts dates 
(April 11 and June 25, 2001) that if found to be 
the draw dates would indeed waive Ellsworth's 
right to file a lien for some portions of the work 
it claimed in its mechanic's lien. The draw 
dates on which Ellsworth relies (each sometime 
in February 2001) would support the conclu-
sion that no portion of its lien claim was 
waived by the April and June checks to which 
SPR cites in support of its position. 
nl5 On summary judgment, the trial 
court deemed the lien waivers applicable 
and held with respect to the lien waiver 
language that 
[b]y endorsing the Central 
Bank checks, Ellsworth . . . 
waived [its] claims and lien 
rights for work performed 
prior to the date that [its] 
draws were requested, but 
not for work performed sub-
sequently. The date of the 
draw request is the date on 
which [Ellsworth] requested 
the draw, not the date the 
check was received or 
cashed. 
This ruling was not challenged on appeal. 
[***34] 
[**273] [*P37] Despite Ellsworth's con-
tention that the trial court "implicitly" found at 
trial that there was no portion of the lien claim 
that was waived by the April and June checks, 
and despite its assertion that it put on extensive 
evidence supporting such a finding, the con-
flicting evidence and the lack of a clear ruling 
by the trial court prevents us from subscribing 
to Ellsworth's position. We therefore remand 
the issue for the trial court to clarify its treat-
ment of the valid lien waivers and to make re-
lated findings relevant thereto. 
B. Indemnity, Warranty, and Guaranty 
Language of the Lien Waiver Provisions 
[*P38] We reverse the trial court's sum-
mary judgment ruling that, although the lien 
waivers were otherwise valid and enforceable, 
the indemnity language in the lien waiver pro-
visions was "inapplicable, invalid and unen-
forceable." We give no particular deference to a 
trial court's interpretation of unambiguous con-
tract language on summary judgment. See 
Meadow Valley Contrs., Inc. v. Transcontinen-
tal Ins. Co., 2001 UT App 190, PI3, 27 P.3d 
594. As the lien waiver provisions are contrac-
tual in nature, when interpreting their language 
we "look[] at [***35] the entire contract and 
all of its parts in relation to each other, giving 
an objective and reasonable construction to the 
contract as a whole." Sears v. Riemersma, 655 
P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah 1982). The trial court's 
view of what was required in order for the in-
demnity language to be applicable miscon-
strued its purpose in the lien waiver provision 
and unreasonably read the indemnity language 
out of the lien waivers. Likewise, when the 
guaranty and warranty language of the lien 
waiver provisions is properly construed in the 
context of the lien waiver agreement, those 
provisions are also valid and enforceable. 
[*P39] Here, as part of the valid lien 
waiver provisions, the applicability of the in-
demnity and guaranty language hinges on the 
relevant draw dates for each check, as is so 
with the specific lien waiver language itself. 
Under the plain language of the lien waiver 
provisions, when construed together as a 
whole, the "[p]ayee warrants and guarantees" 
that through the draw dates "payment in full 
has been made . . . to the suppliers of all labor 
and materials to the Property incurred at the 
insistence of payee." To the extent "any liens or 
claims" are "made [***36] against the Prop-
erty by any supplier of labor [or] material" pro-
vided up through the relevant draw date, the 
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payee, by signing the lien waiver provision, 
"agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the 
owner of the Property . . . from any loss, 
claims, or expenses incurred by [the Property 
owner] by reason of or rising out of any liens or 
claims made against the Property." Thus, as 
with the question of whether Ellsworth has 
waived any amounts contained in its me-
chanic's lien claim, whether Ellsworth must 
indemnify SPR for any of the lien claims 
brought against it by Ellsworth's subcontractors 
and suppliers depends on whether any of those 
liens arose out of work performed before the 
draw date of a specific check that Ellsworth 
signed and also guarantied that it had paid. As 
to any such lien or claim, Ellsworth would be 
responsible for the payment by way of its guar-
anty and its agreement to indemnify the Prop-
erty owner therefor. Accordingly, we remand 
for the trial court to make any additional find-
ings necessary to determine the effect, if any, 
the indemnity, warranty, and guaranty language 
has on the liens filed against the Northshore 
Property and to determine any relief to which 
SPR [***37] may be entitled under those pro-
visions. 
V. Prejudgment Interest 
[*P40] Ellsworth appeals the trial court's 
prejudgment interest determination. While we 
need not address this issue as our decision to-
day reverses the final judgment in several re-
spects and remands several issues for the trial 
court's further consideration, we nonetheless 
choose to treat the prejudgment interest issue 
here because it could well arise again during 
the proceedings on remand. See Bair v. Axiom 
Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT20, P22, 20 P.3d 388 
("[W]here an appellate court finds that it is 
necessary to remand a case for further proceed-
ings, it has the duty of fpass[ing] on matters 
which may then become material.'") (citation 
omitted). 
[*P41] Ellsworth argues that the trial court 
erred in refusing to award Ellsworth interest 
[**274] on the amounts of the three final pay-
ment applications as part of the prejudgment 
interest award. The trial court held that because 
it was undisputed that Ellsworth never submit-
ted the three applications to anyone for pay-
ment, it was "not possible for the [cjourt to set 
a specific date on which payment of the three 
unsubmitted applications became due," 
[***38] and it refused to "simply 'pick a date' 
from which interest beg[an] to accrue." Ells-
worth argues that because the terms of its con-
tract with Broadstone provide for contractual 
interest to accrue, it was entitled to interest ac-
crued on the amounts of these three payment 
applications. 
[*P42] Ellsworth's contention that the trial 
court's ruling appears to blur the distinction be-
tween the requirements for receiving an award 
of contractual interest and those for receiving 
an award of prejudgment interest as a matter of 
damages is well taken. See Consolidation Coal 
Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 
886 P.2d 514, 528 n.23 (Utah 1994) ('"A dis-
tinction exists between interest stated by the 
terms of a contract to be paid before its breach 
and interest recoverable by way of damages 
after a breach, although the term "interest" is 
often used indiscriminately to describe both 
amounts.'") (citation omitted). "Prejudgment 
interest may be awarded in a case where the 
loss is fixed as of a particular time and the 
amount of the loss can be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy," Jorgensen v. John 
Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 1983), 
which makes [***39] such an award discre-
tionary and dependent on finding that the debt 
was or became liquidated. See Bjork v. April 
Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah) (stating 
general requirements for receiving an award of 
prejudgment interest), cert, denied, 431 US. 
930, 97 S. Ct. 2634, 53 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1977). In 
contrast, "'[contractual interest is the creature 
of contract and is recoverable only as provided 
by its terms.'" Consolidation Coal, 886 P.2d at 
528 n.23 (citation omitted). Where an agree-
ment provides for contractual interest to accrue, 
that interest becomes "an integral part of the 
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debt as the principal itself," Farnworth v. Jen-
sen, 117 Utah 494, 217 P.2d 571, 575 (1950) 
(internal quotations, citation, and emphasis 
omitted), and it is not discretionarily awarded. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-4(2)(a) (2005) 
(M[A] judgment rendered on a lawful contract 
shall conform to the contract and shall bear the 
interest agreed upon by the parties[.]ff). 
[*P43] The difficulty we have here with 
the trial court's treatment of the prejudgment 
interest issue is that, while explicitly holding 
that Ellsworth was [***40] "entitled to pre-
judgment contractual interest on its breach of 
contract claim as requested," the trial court 
nevertheless refused to award interest attribut-
able to the three payment applications. It is not 
clear whether the trial court did so because un-
der the general rules governing prejudgment 
interest the amounts due on the three payment 
applications were not liquidated, or whether the 
trial court determined that under the terms of 
the contract Ellsworth was not entitled to con-
tractual interest on the three payment applica-
tions because it never submitted them for pay-
ment. 
[*P44] It may very well be that under the 
terms of the contract Ellsworth is not entitled to 
interest on the payment applications because 
they were never submitted. The contract states, 
with our emphasis, that interest is to accrue at 
"[t]en percent (10%) per annum thirty (30) days 
after the date of the Invoice for payment." 
Since it was undisputed that Ellsworth never 
submitted the three applications, there appears 
to be no "date of the Invoice for payment" that 
marks the beginning of the thirty-day period 
before interest would begin to accrue, which 
under the plain language of the contract sug-
gests [***4i] that contractual interest on those 
applications would be inappropriate. See Con-
solidation Coal, 886 P. 2d at 528 n.23. Yet if, 
as Ellsworth contends, the payment applica-
tions were never submitted because Hatch had 
disappeared and there was no one to whom 
they could have been submitted~and it appears 
to be somewhat disputed whether Ellsworth 
could have found Hatch and submitted the three 
payment applications—that may have bearing 
on whether Ellsworth may still recover interest 
under the contract. 
VI. Attorney Fees 
[*P45] SPR appeals from the trial court's 
award of attorney fees below, and Ellsworth 
[**275] requests we grant it attorney fees on 
appeal. Given our reversal of several of the trial 
court's rulings and given our remand, we must 
vacate the trial court's award of attorney fees 
because it is no longer clear who the prevailing 
party is. However, as was the case with the pre-
judgment interest issue, the attorney fee issue 
will present itself again on remand and requires 
brief comment. 
[*P46] It is clear that Utah law requires 
the prevailing party, and ultimately the court, to 
allocate the prevailing party's attorney fees 
among those claims for which it is [***42] en-
titled to an award of attorney fees and those for 
which it is not. See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumb-
ing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 
87, P32, 977 P.2d 518, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 
1271 (Utah 1999). SPR argues that because 
Ellsworth is not entitled under the contract to 
attorney fees for its breach of contract claim-
the contract contained no attorney fees provi-
sion—Ellsworth and the trial court failed to 
properly allocate those noncompensable attor-
ney fees related to the breach of contract claim 
and those compensable fees related to the me-
chanic's lien claim. 
[*P47] While it is true that under the me-
chanic's lien statute Ellsworth is not entitled "to 
attorney fees incurred in pursuing its nonlien 
claims which were 'completely separate,'" 
American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems 
Commun. Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 193 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) (citation omitted), the breach of 
contract claim here was so inextricably tied to 
the mechanic's lien claim as to warrant group-
ing these fees together. Indeed, it almost goes 
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without saying that a breach of contract claim 
is typically such an integral part of a me-
chanic's lien claim that a party [***43] cannot 
pursue such a claim without also proving the 
existence of a contract, a payment due under 
the contract, and a breach of that contract by 
nonpayment. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P48] We remand this matter to the trial 
court for further consideration in accordance 
with this opinion. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
[*P49] WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
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ADDENDUM D: DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-25 (2001) (mechanics' lien act) 
38-1-25. Abuse of lien right — Penalty. 
(1) Any person entitled to record or file a lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim of lien against any property, which 
contains a greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or filed: 
(a) with the intent to cloud the title; 
(b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of the excessive claim of 
lien more than is due; or 
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or benefit. 
(2) In addition to any criminal penalties under Subsection (1), a person who violates 
Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the property or an original contractor or 
subcontractor who is affected by the lien for the greater of: 
(a) twice the amount by which the wrongful lien exceeds the amount actually 
due; or 
(b) the actual damages incurred by the owner of the property. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-3, -3.19 -4 (2002) (partnership act) 
48-1-3. "Partnership" defined. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a partnership is an association of two 
or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit. 
(b) "Partnership" when used in a statute of the state, includes a limited liability 
partnership registered under Section 48-1-42, unless the context requires otherwise. 
(2) An association formed under any other statute of this state, or any statute 
adopted by authority other than the authority of this state, is not a partnership under this 
chapter, unless such association would have been a partnership in this state prior to the 
adoption of this chapter. 
(3) This chapter shall apply to limited partnerships except in so far as the statutes 
relating to such partnerships are inconsistent herewith. 
48-1-3.1. Joint venture defined — Application of chapter. 
(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners 
of a single business enterprise. 
(2) This chapter governs the property and transfer rights of joint ventures. 
48-1-4. Rules for determining the existence of a partnership. 
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules shall apply: 
(1) Except as provided by Section 48-1-13, persons who are not partners as to each 
other are not partners as to third persons. 
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by entireties, joint property, common 
property, or part ownership does not of itself establish a partnership, whether such co-
owners do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property. 
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or 
not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property 
from which the returns are derived. 
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie 
evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such 
profits were received in payment: 
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise. 
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord. 
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner. 
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of payment vary with the profits of 
the business. 
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will of a business or other 
property by installments or otherwise. 
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BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company; CENTRAL BANK, a 
Utah banking corporation; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company; ALLSTATE 
ELECTRIC, a Utah corporation; HUBS TILE, 
INC., a Utah corporation; WESTWOOD MILL 
& CABINET, INC., a Utah corporation; 
DEBRA A. BURNETT and MICHAEL L. 
BURNETT, dba ALARM TECH; 
HALVERSON MECHANICAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation; MASCO CONTRACTOR 
SERVICES CENTRAL, INC., a Utah 
corporation dba HANSEN-ALL SEASONS 
INSULATION; DECORATIVE 
LANDSCAPING, INC., a Utah corporation; the 
DAN PARKINSON FAMILY LIMITED 
PARTNERSHIP; Guy HATCH, an individual; 
JOHN DOES 1-20 and all other persons 
unknown claiming any interest to the subject 
real property, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST 51-SPR ON ISSUE OF 
LIABILITY AS JOINT 
VENTURER WITH AND 
PARTNER OF BROADSTONE 
Civil No. 020400442 
Civil No. 010405059 
Consolidated into 
Civil No. 010405059 
Judge Schofield 
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ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT to Ellsworth Paulsen 
Construction Company on the issue of 51-SPR LLC's liability as joint venturer, partner or successor 
in relation to Broadstone Investments, LC based upon a ruling by the Court dated December 30, 
2002. 
This case is before the court on Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Service's ("EPCO") May 24, 
2002 motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendant 51-SPR-LLC's ("51-SPR" or 
"Chimento") liability as a joint venturer, partner, or successor in relation to Broadstone Investments, 
LC ("Broadstone").1 51-SPR opposes the motion. 
Having reviewed the parties' respective memoranda, and the evidence on file, and heard oral 
argument on the matter, I now issue this ruling granting the motion. 
In essence, EPCO asserts that it has not been paid certain sums due for construction services 
performed on the Northshore I and II commercial real estate development project (the "Project") 
pursuant to contracts and related change orders signed by Broadstone or its agents. If Broadstone 
and 51-SPR were partners or joint venturers on the Project, 51-SPR is jointly and severally liable for 
all debts chargeable to the partnership or joint venture, including the sums due to EPCO under the 
contracts to develop the Project. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-10 to -12; Both v. Wliite, 799 P.2d 213, 
218 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-10 tp -12). 
1
 The central issue before the court has been cast principally as one of joint venture. 
However, in footnote 2 of its supplemental supporting memorandum, counsel for EPCO correctly 
notes that "partnership law and joint venture law are essentially indistinguishable." (citing 
Nupetco Assoc, v. Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877, 882 fn. 3 (Utah 1983). See also Utah Code Ann § 48-
1-3.1; Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 218 (Utah App. 1990) ("[§48-1-3.1] provides that joint 
ventures are governed by the partnership act."). 
2 
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Summary Judgment Standard, 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Where the motion for summary judgment is supported by evidence and 
sworn testimony, as is the case here, the party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon mere 
allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of fact to be tried. See 
Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983). 
Whether or not there was a joint venture relationship is a factual question. Rogers v. M.O. 
Bitner, Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1932 (Utah 1987). However, in this case, where the "facts are not in 
dispute . . . the relationship of the parties is a matter of law." Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 
1974). 
Joint Venture Factors. 
The Utah Code defines "joint venture" as "an association of two or more persons to carry on 
as co-owners of a single business enterprise." Utah Code Ann. §48-1-3.1. The Utah Supreme Court 
has declared Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1 (Utah 1974) to be the "leading case in Utah defining the 
elements essential to a joint venture." Betenson v. Call Auto & Equipment Sales, 645 P.2d 684, 686 
(Utah 1982). Bassett states: 
A joint venture is an agreement between two or more persons 
ordinarily but not necessarily limited to a single transaction for the 
purpose of making a profit. The requirements for the relationship are 
not exactly defined, but certain elements are essential: The parties 
must combine their property, money, effects, skill, labor, and 
3 
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knowledge. AS a general rule, there must be a community of interest 
in the performance of the common purpose, a joint proprietary 
interest in the subject matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share 
in the profits, and unless there is an agreement to the contrary, a duty 
to share in any losses which may be sustained. 
530 P.2d at 2-3 (footnotes omitted). In Rogers v. M.O, Bitner, the court states that "[a] joint venture 
does not always rise pursuant to formal agreement; rather, it is a relationship voluntarily entered by 
the parties and may be proven by the actions taken by the parties. The characterizations given by the 
parties are certainly not determinative of the issue." 738 P.2d 1029, 1032 (emphasis added). 
In this case both the written agreements and the parties' undisputed actions indicate that 51-
SPR was not merely Broadstone's creditor, but that 51-SPR was actively involved with Broadstone 
in the business of developing and maintaining the Project in anticipation of earning a profit. While 
Broadstone was the principal supplier of skill, labor, and knowledge as an on-site project manager, 
51-SPR was the principal supplier of capital to the venture. Both parties had a common inte4rest 
in the Project and each expected to participate in the profits expected to follow. 
Background and Addendum #2. 
In April 2000, Guy Hatch (of Broadstone) and Chimento met with Ford Motor Company 
("Ford") for the purpose of acquiring the real property upon which the Northshore I and II buildings 
were constructed. While 51-SPR insists that Hatch met with Ford before Chimento did, Chimento 
admits to being "involved in the acquisition of the property, in putting it under contract." The real 
estate purchase agreement ("RESPA") lists the purchase price of the Northshore property at 




It is undisputed that Broadstone and 51 South Portland Realty executed Addendum #2 to the 
RESPA (the "Agreement"), labeled "DATED June 15, 2000" at the top of the document. It is also 
undisputed that all of 51 South Portland Realty's interest in the Agreement is now owned by 51-SPR 
and that the term "Chimento" in the Agreement refers to 51 South Portland Realty. 
The Agreement undisputedly provides that 1) The parties would own the Northshore property 
as tenants in common; 2) 51-SPR would contribute $2.9 million, of which $1.75 million would be 
used to acquire the land, and another $1.2 million would be applied to site work and construction 
costs; 3) Broadstone would be the "project manager," would "operate the venture," would obtain 
long term financing, enter into construction contracts, supervise construction, and obtain leases on 
the buildings; 4) Chimento would execute a mortgage to secure institutional construction financing; 
5) Chimento funds for site development and construction costs ("hard" costs only) would be utilized 
"on a standard draw schedule . . . after inspection approval by a Chimento engineer"; 6) Broadstone 
would be a single member single purpose company, whose "ownership interest and control shall be 
pledged to Chimento to secure [its] obligations"; and 7) Broadstone would "mortgage its tenancy in 
common interest to Chimento [51]SPR] to secure the pledge and restriction agreements as well [as] 
Hatch's obligations."2 
The Agreement also provides: 
[1] The parties intend that following completion of the project... but not earlier that 
1/1/2001, as they may hereafter agree, Chimento and [Broadstone] may transfer their 
interests to a new Utah LLC to be owned equally by them, otherwise consistent with 
2
 See 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, pp. 8-9. These are the undisputed characterizations of the items in 
Addendum #2. 
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the terms of this memo, but in any event the project shall be held for investment and 
all actions by the parties shall be in furtherance of that goal. (Agreement p. 2, f4); 
[2] Chimento shall receive a 10% return on its capital commencing December 1, 
2000 through the end of the first year following closing . . . to be paid monthly . . . 
. Hatch shall guaranty such return, to be paid from operating income of the project, 
if sufficient, and if not, then from proceeds of a sale of a portion of the land . . . if 
any, [Broadstone} shall contribute any and all sums to the project needed to payment 
of such return. (Agreement p.2, f 6); 
[3] Any net operating income remaining in the first year [shall be paid] to Hatch [of 
Broadstone], (Agreement p. 2, f7); 
[4] Chimento shall have the option to receive a 10% return on its capital for a second 
year on terms set forth above for year 1, or to share 50/50 in net operating income of 
the project. . . (Agreement p. 2, ^[8); 
[5] Thereafter Chimento and [Broadstone] shall share 50/50 in net operating income 
of the project. (Agreement p. 2, 16); 
[6] Permanent financing will "take out" all financed construction costs... the project 
. . . will secure the same . . . . The parties agree to consult as to the amount of 
permanent financing which may exceed the above and, if agreed, such excess to be 
applied as follows: to Chimento to reimburse the following order as available, (i) 
land closing costs; (ii) allocated construction costs, i.e. building 1 and building 2; (iii) 
allocated site improvement costs, i.e. building 1 and building 2; and after Chimento 
capital repaid in full, to each 50/50. (Agreement p.2, 110; 
[7] Subsequent capital transactions (refinances, sales, casualty or condemnation) after 
debt repayment to: (i) remaining unpaid Chimento capital; and thereafter (ii) to each 
50/50. (Agreement p. 3,11); 
[8] All decisions regarding the project shall be mutually made after consultation. 
(Agreement p. 3,13); 
[9] Monthly construction and leasing reports to be submitted by Hatch. (Agreement 
p. 3,14); and 
[10] Hatch development entity (not Utah LLC) shall enter into a consulting 
agreement with Chimentos, individually, with regard to property development 
inclusive of the project, to a term running through March 1, 2001, for a fee of 
6 
$24,000.00 per month payable monthly commencing July 1, 2000 (except the July 
1 2000 payment shall be $12,000.00. (Agreement p. 3,19). 
Joint proprietary interest in the subject matter. 
While joint tenancy alone does not of itself create a joint venture or partnership,351-SPR's 
proprietary interests in the Project severely undermines its assertions that it was merely a "creditor" 
or "investor" on the Project. 51-SPR does not dispute that both parties had ownership interests in 
the Project, at the outset.4 And since December 13, 2000, 51-SPR has owned the property in fee 
simple except for one day.5 It is undisputed that as of November, 2002, "[t]he Northshore building 
II is 100% occupied, and the Northshore Building I is approximately 70% occupied [and] 51-SPR 
receives about $70,000 per month for tenants, but pays $20,000 or $30,000 to the bank to debt 
service the construction loan."6 
Mutual right to control. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. §48-1-4. 
4
 According to counsel for 51-SPR, "Mr Chimento testified that, after discovering 
Broadstone and Hatch's misappropriation, breach of duty, and fraud, he believed that 
Broadstone's interest in the property should be surrendered to 50-SPR." 51-SPR's response to 
EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial summary judgment, p. 15. However, 
"the surrender of Broadstone's interest in the Property has been called into question by Dan 
Parkinson." Id. (citing Chimento Aff. at 125). I note that regardless of the current ownership 
status of the property (at worst 51-SPR retains a one-half interest), the undisputed facts satisfy 
the "joint proprietary interest" factor in determining joint venture status. 
5
 51-SPR does not dispute that at the end of January, 2001, it conveyed the property to 
Broadstone and Broadstone reconveyed the Property to 50-SPR the next day. 51-SPR's response 
to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial summary judgment, p. 12. 
6
 Id., p. 16,111. (citing Chimento Dep. P. 125-26). 
7 
As an owner of the Project property, 51-SPR had the right to control the activities relating 
to the Project. Nothing in the parties' Agreement abrogated 51-SPR's right to control, but only 
insured that right. While Broadstone had authority to obtain long term financing, enter into 
construction contracts, supervise construction, and obtain leases on the buildings, it was required to 
"pledge" its "ownership interest and control . . . to Chimento" (Agreement p. 2, fl) (emphasis 
added).7 Significantly, the Agreement provided: "All decisions regarding the project shall be 
mutually made after consultation." (Agreement p. 3, ^ 3) (emphasis added). 
51-SPR asserts that Chimento rarely visited the construction site, and did not actually 
"approve" construction draws, and that he did not believe he had veto power over the tenants on his 
property. Even if these assertions are true, the degree of control actually exercised by 51-SPR is not 
determinative of the control factor. The terms of the Agreement, together with 51-SPR's ownership 
of the property, unquestionably gave 51-SPR the right to exercise mutual control on "all decisions 
regarding the project." 
In addition, 51-SPR had the right to receive monthly reports from Broadstone under the 
Agreement. It is undisputed that Chimento visited the construction site at least six times, and 
reviewed leases and construction draws to "keep abreast of the management" of the Project.8 Given 
both the terms of the Agreement and the actual control9 exerted by 51-SPR in this case, I simply 
7
 This suggests that Broadstone was an agent for 51-SPR. 
8
 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, p. 24. 
9
 Counsel for 51-SPR admits that when 51-SPR "discovered Broadstone's fraud" it then 
"executed the Termination of Co-Ownership Agreement" and now collects monthly rents on the 
8 
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cannot credit 51-SPR's conclusory allegation that Broadstone "had sole responsibility and authority 
to develop and manage the Property."10 
Right to share in the profits. 
Utah law provides: "the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima 
facie evidence that he is a partner in the business," Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-4(4). While I do not 
address whether "profits" were actually received in this case, the Agreement gave both parties the 
right to share in the profits from the Project. The Agreement provided that 51-SPR would receive 
a monthly 10% "return on its capital" to be guaranteed by Broadstone. Any net operating income 
remaining in the first year would go to Broadstone. The second year, 51-SPR would have the option 
to receive a 10% "return on its capital" or to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project. 
Thereafter the parties were "to share 50/50 in net operating income of the project." (Agreement p. 
2, fS) (emphasis added). Mr. Chimento himself, acknowledged the 50/50 arrangement in his 
deposition.11 
A duty to share in any losses which may be sustained, 
51-SPR argues that it "never agreed to share in any losses incurred by Broadstone," but that 
it "merely agreed to serve as an investor or financier in the development of the Property."12 Mr. 
property. 
10
 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, p. 24. 
11
 Chimento Dep. pp. 137-138. 
12
 51-SPR's response to EPCO's supplemental memorandum in support of partial 
summary judgment, p. 20. 
9 
- 3622 
Chimento's affidavit sates: "51-SPR was not liable or responsible for any losses, liabilities, or 
responsibilities relating to the Property, and under its arrangement with Broadstone, stood to lose 
only its investment in the Property and nothing more."13 While these bald assertions contradict 
EPCO's position, they do not create any genuine issue of material fact. 51-SPR's denials of liability 
are simply conclusory allegations which are sharply contradicted by both the terms of the Agreement 
and the undisputed facts. 
The terms of the Agreement, 51-SPR's ownership interest in the Project, and 51-SPR's 
undisputed actions all gave rise to 51-SPR's duty to share in any losses which may be sustained by 
the Project. There is no indication from the facts that the parties expected the Project to be anything 
less than profitable, thus it is no surprise that loss-sharing duties were not spelled out in detail. 
However, the Agreement essentially put 51-SPR's $2.9 million immediately at risk should the 
venture completely fail. In addition, the Agreement made 51-SPR one-half owner14 of a tenancy in 
common with all the accompanying liabilities of a real property owner, including applicable tax and 
tort liabilities. The Agreement did not purport to limit Chimento's duty to share losses by providing 
that "Chimento will execute mortgage as to its tenancy in common interest to secure institutional 
construction financing but will not be obligated on any Note or by way of guarantee at any time." 
13
 Chimento affidavit, 1 10. 
14
 In addition, by its terms, the Agreement required that Broadstone's "ownership interest 
and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure [its] and Hatch's obligations," and that 




(Agreement, p. 1,17) (emphasis added).15 However, 51-SPR apparently ignored or waived this 
provision when it agreed with Central Bank in April, 2002 to guarantee "Broadstone's" #4.3 million 
construction loans. 
Simply put, the Agreement and the undisputed facts demonstrate that this is not a case of 51-
SPR acting as a simple creditor to Broadstone. 51-SPR insists that it only guaranteed Broadstone's 
loans to avoid foreclosure. One may wonder, however, whether foreclosure would have been so 
great a concern if, as it alleges, 51-SPR was merely a secured creditor in a priority position. In fact, 
however, 51-SPR voluntarily conveyed the Project property to Broadstone for one day in January 
2001 so that Broadstone could secure additional financing for the Project. In doing so, 51-SPR 
voluntarily put its own property at greater risk of loss in furtherance of the joint venture. 
The parties' characterizations. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that "[t]he characterizations given by the parties 
are certainly not determinative" of the joint venture relationship. Rogers v. M.O. Bitner, 738 P.2d 
1029, 1032. Thus, it is not dispositive to the joint venture or partnership determination that the 
Agreement provided that the project would merely be "held for investment" or that the parties' tax 
returns would "reflect that the property is held as tenants-in-common interests and not as a 
partnership."16 In contrast, 51-SPR's letter written by Robert Chimento to Richard Ellsworth on 
15
 A partial limitation on 51-SPR's liability for losses would not preclude a finding of 
joint venture under the Basset factors. In making the joint venture determination, the duty to 
share losses is a factor "unless there is an agreement to the contrary." Bassett v. Baker, P.2d 
(emphasis added). 
16
 Agreement, p. 2, f 4 and p. 3, <H 7-8. 
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October 9, 2001 is telling. Mr. Chimento's letter discusses the "handling" of the project by Guy 
Hatch and later states: 
Please realize that it was never our intent to be late in our payments to anyone, and 
we certainly had good reasons to support the statements we made to you that led you 
to believe that you would be paid by now. If not for the economic uncertainty 
resulting from the 9/11 attacks, our Buyer and/or our permanent financing would 
have closed by now. 
(emphasis added). 
Whether these written statements create partnership by estoppel,17 they demonstrate Mr. Chimento's 
understanding of 51-SPR's joint obligation to EPCO for work performed on the Project.18 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the undisputed material facts, I grant EPCO's motion for partial summary 
judgment. 51-SPR is liable to EPCO as a joint venturer or partner with regard to services rendered 
pursuant to the contracts and change orders executed between Broadstone and EPCO relating to the 
Project.19 
17
 See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-13. "When a person by words spoken or written or by 
conduct represents himself . . . to anyone as a partner . . . he is liable to any such person to whom 
such representation has been made who has on the faith of such representation given credit to the 
actual or apparent partnership . . . When a partnership liability results, he is liable as if he were 
an actual member of the partnership . . . When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly 
with the other persons . . . so consenting to the . . . representation as to incur liability; otherwise 
separately." Id. 
18
 Interestingly, in the same letter, Mr. Chimento suggests that "[a]nother possibility" to 
ensure EPCO's receipt of payment "is a partnership of some kind." Chimento suggests, "perhaps 
we could both make a profit." 
19
 While I believe it may be possible to conclude that 51-SPR was the principal owner of 
the Project with Broadstone merely acting as its agent, I do not make that finding today. Because 
I find 51-SPR liable to EPCO as a partner or joint venturer with Broadstone, I do not reach the 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION I 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES and FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
ELLSWORTH PECK CONSTRUCTION CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
COMPANY, 
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vs. Judge Gary D. Stott 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
limited liability company; 51-SPR-L.L.C, a 
Utah limited liability company; 
Defendants. 
On December 8, 9, and 10, 2003, this Court conducted a three-day bench trial. 
Arguments were presented to the court concerning various motions submitted by Ellsworth 
Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth Paulsen"), and 51-SPR LLC ("51-SPR"). At the 
trial, the following issues were addressed: (1) the status of certain change orders; (2) abuse of 
lien right under U.C.A. §38-1-25; (3) wrongful lien under U.C.A. §38-9-1; (4) contract damages; 
and (5) attorney's fees. 
1 
Draaity 
Prior to the trial, both parties submitted memoranda of points and authorities in further 
support of their positions. After considering the arguments presented by the parties at the 
hearing, the Court requested additional briefing on issues related to Ellsworth Paulsen's 
recoverability of the value of extra work and pre-judgment interest calculation. The Court has 
considered all memoranda submitted by the parties, the arguments presented at trial, the relevant 
case law and statutory provisions, and being fully advised in the matter, issues the following 
ruling: 
BACKGROUND 
51-SPR, as a joint venture with Guy Hatch and Broadstone Investments, L.C. 
("Broadstone") entered into an agreement with Ellsworth Paulsen to construct two commercial 
buildings, Northshore Building I and Northshore Building II, on real property located in 
American Fork, Utah. 
Richard Ellsworth has been the sole owner of Ellsworth Paulsen since 1984. Mr. 
Ellsworth has his general contractor's license and is an engineer. Guy Hatch was the apparent 
owner of the project in question. Prior to the commencement of the project in question, Mr. 
Hatch and Ellsworth Paulsen had participated in the construction of a project in American Fork 
that consisted of approximately six buildings. Mr. Hatch acted as the construction manager of 
the American Fork project and also functioned in that capacity for the North Shore project. 
Ellsworth Paulsen contends that the North Shore project was ultimately completed as required 
and monies are due and owing from Broadstone and 51-SPR. 
To finance construction of Building I and Building II, Broadstone obtained construction 
loans for each building from Central Bank. During the course of construction, Ellsworth Paulsen 
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or Broadstone would submit periodic draw requests to Central Bank requesting payments for 
Ellsworth Paulsen and the subcontractors for work performed on the buildings. The 
subcontractors, Halverson, Westwood, and Allstate, prepared and submitted draw requests for 
Ellsworth Paulsen, and Ellsworth Paulsen prepared comprehensive payment requests which were 
submitted to Broadstone. Broadstone then prepared a payment request which was submitted to 
Central Bank and Central Bank prepared checks for payment to Ellsworth Paulsen and the 
subcontractors. Once the draws were approved, joint checks were issued by Central Bank and 
forwarded to Broadstone and Ellsworth Paulsen for disbursement to the respective 
subcontractors. 
Because the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen were not fully paid for the services 
and materials provided to Building I and/or Building II, each recorded mechanic's liens against 
the property in the office of the Utah County recorder. Ellsworth Paulsen also filed a Notice of 
Lien on November 13, 2001 and filed an amended Notice of Lien on November 16, 2001 with 
the Utah County Recorder's Office. Ellsworth Paulsen sent a copy of the Notice of Lien filed on 
November 16, 2001, to the reputed owner of the property, Broadstone Investments, via certified 
mail and to Robert Chimento of 51-SPR via certified mail. Ellsworth Paulsen also filed a timely 
lis pendens. 
Judge Schofield previously determined that 51-SPR and Broadstone were in a joint-
venture and that 51-SPR was liable for the amounts owed Ellsworth Paulsen, if any, by reason of 
its relationship with Broadstone. The parties are well-aware of the historical relationship 
between Broadstone and 51-SPR. This Court finds it unnecessary to further recite information 
with respect to that relationship and the historical information in the litigation that has brought 
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the parties to the time of trial. Rather, this Court focuses specifically on its findings and 
decisions as to issues that were addressed at the time of trial. 
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
A. Change Orders 
1. The balance due and owing on North Shore Building I is in the amount of 
$199,830.53. The balance due and owing on North Shore Building II is in the amount of 
$364,991.26. These amounts are reflected by information contained in Plaintiffs Exhibits 5 and 
6, respectively. 
2 As to the property referred to as the Williams property, the evidence establishes 
that Guy Hatch contacted Mr. Ellsworth showing to him drawings which proposed the 
development of the Williams property including Buildings I and II on the property in question. 
Mr. Hatch, the primary principal and owner of the property for Buildings I and II, requested that 
Mr. Ellsworth enter into an agreement with him wherein Ellsworth Paulsen paid the sum of 
$110,000 to Vintage Construction for what Mr. Ellsworth assumed was to be for engineering 
design work and other costs for the Williams property and possibly for Building II. 
3. Ellsworth Paulsen gave a check to Vintage Construction for $110,000 which 
included $32,000 for the Broadstone project and $78,000 for the Williams North Shore project. 
The evidence establishes that Mr. Hatch did not inform Mr. Ellsworth how the money was to be 
used and where the funds were to go. Mr. Ellsworth assumed, based on his conversations with 
Mr. Hatch, that the monies would go to those two respective projects. Mr. Hatch instructed Mr. 
Ellsworth that a change order for Building II in the amount of $78,000 could be applied in that 
fashion. 
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4. As the result of a conversation with Mr. Hatch, Mr. Ellsworth was unsure how the 
$78,000 was to be used but was informed that Hubble Engineering would be involved on the 
project and Mr. Hatch further represented that Ellsworth Paulsen would be repaid the $78,000. 
5. Mr. Ellsworth paid the $78,000 as per the instruction of Mr. Hatch, without 
determining where the money was going and how it was going to be applied to the project. Mr. 
Ellsworth relied upon representations of Mr. Hatch, as the owner and construction manager of 
the project, as to how the money would be used with assurances that Broads tone would be 
responsible for the repayment to Ellsworth Paulsen. 
6. During the course of the project, Mr. Hatch disappeared. Ellsworth Paulsen 
attempted to find Mr. Hatch, but for a significant period of time was unable to do so. As of 
November 2001, Ellsworth Paulsen became aware that 51-SPR was somehow involved in the 
project, but did not know their status or relationship with Mr. Hatch. Mr. Hatch was eventually 
found by representatives of Ellsworth Paulsen to be living in Hawaii. A number of change 
orders had been requested by Mr. Hatch for the project in question; the work had been done by 
Ellsworth Paulsen, and yet the change orders had not been signed. Eventually, Mr. Hatch agreed 
to sign all the change orders sent to him in Hawaii for that purpose. 
7. The evidence establishes that Mr. Hatch would directly contact the subcontractors 
working on the project, in most instances without first communicating with Ellsworth Paulsen, 
and would make requests for changes. The work and changes requested by Mr. Hatch were 
completed and in many cases Ellsworth Paulsen found out about the changes after the fact. 
8. The evidence establishes that all of the requests for change orders by Mr. Natch 
were performed by the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen with work being completed as 
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requested and Ellsworth Paulsen ultimately being assured by Mr. Hatch on behalf of Broadstone 
that the subcontractors would be paid for their work. The change orders took place in this 
fashion in both Building I and II. It was not the custom or practice of Ellsworth Paulsen or Mr. 
Hatch/Broadstone, to communicate with the architect for approval of the change orders. In fact, 
the process for requesting change orders and having them approved involved eliminating the 
architect from that procedure both by Ellsworth Paulsen and by Broadstone. 
9. As to the information reflected in Defendants' Exhibit 64 pertaining to Building I, 
all of the work requested in Mr. Hatch's change orders on behalf of Broadstone was completed 
by Ellsworth Paulsen. 
10. Although the evidence establishes that the parties entered into the agreement for ~ 
the development of the project to construct Building I and II using AIA document forms, this 
Court finds that the custom and practice between Ellsworth Paulsen and Broadstone resulted in a 
deviation from the requirement for change orders as contained in the AIA documents. As the 
general custom and practice, and as a result of the relationship between Ellsworth Paulsen and 
Mr. Hatch/Broadstone, all of the change orders were not written and signed off on prior to the 
time work began. The change orders were done at the request of Mr. Hatch without consultation 
by him with the architect, and as established in many instances, without consulting with 
Ellsworth Paulsen. Instead, Mr. Hatch directly communicated and instructed the subcontractors 
to make changes. 
11. By reason of the agreed upon procedure and process for processing change orders, 
Broadstone waived any claim that all the change orders must be signed and the court finds that 
all work requested by Mr. Hatch/Broadstone of the subcontractors and Ellsworth Paulsen was 
completed. 
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12. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot collect from 51-SPR the $78,000 it 
paid Mr. Hatch/Broadstone. Mr. Hatch's activity and participation with respect to the Williams 
property did not relate to his agreements with Mr. Chimento and 51-SPR for the development of 
the Auto Mall/North Shore project, nor was the Williams property part of the development of the 
two North Shore buildings. 
B. Mr, Wilson 
13. The evidence establishes that Mark Wilson was the architect on the project and Mr. 
Hatch asked him to design Northshore Buildings I and II. Mr. Wilson contracted with 
Broadstone and Mr. Hatch for work he did on the project. The evidence does not indicate that 
Mr. Wilson ever dealt with 51-SPR as to any work he performed on the project. 
14. The evidence establishes that on occasion, Mr. Hatch would meet with Mr. Wilson 
and discuss the status of the project. But Mr. Hatch, on behalf of Broadstone, left Mr. Wilson 
out of the loop in requesting and approving change orders. Mr. Hatch himself contacted the 
subcontractors directly without prior consultation with Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson was eventually 
informed by Mr. Hatch of the change orders that were requested and work that was performed on 
both Buildings of the Northshore project. 
15. Mr. Wilson, based upon his meetings with Mr. Hatch believed that all of the work 
required by Mr. Hatch from Ellsworth Paulsen was performed according to the change order 
request. On rare occasion, the evidence establishes that Ellsworth Paulsen brought change 
orders to Mr. Wilson for his approval and signature. 
C. Mr. Chimento 
16. Mr. Chimento is a real estate developer residing in California. 51-SPR is an entity 
established by Mr. Chimento. Mr. Chimento and his brother met Mr. Hatch in approximately 
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1999 and over a period of time discussed with him the development of what Mr. Chimento 
referred to as the Auto Mall property in American Fork. The testimony of Mr. Chimento 
establishes that as of approximately August 2001, as a result of discussions between Mr. 
Chimento on behalf of 51-SPR and Mr. Hatch, on behalf of Broadstone, that Mr. Hatch 
voluntarily surrendered all of his interest in the project involving Buildings I and II. The 
evidence establishes that at all times during the development and construction of Buildings I and 
II, Mr. Hatch had the authority for an acted on behalf of Mr. Chimento and 51-SPR. 
17. The evidence establishes that Ellsworth Paulsen had no reason to submit the 
change orders for approval by 51-SPR because Ellsworth Paulsen was unaware of 51-SPR's 
interest in the project. 
18. Shortly before the completion of the project, Mr. Ellsworth became aware of Mr. 
Chimento and communication ensued between Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Chimento. Mr. Ellsworth 
advised Mr. Chimento that Ellsworth Paulsen had not been paid for its work on the project and 
Mr. Chimento assured Mr. Ellsworth that he would look into the matter and determine what 
needed to be done to assure payment to Ellsworth Paulsen and complete construction on the 
project. 
D, Notice of Interest 
19. The evidence establishes that the Notice of Interest, Defendants' Exhibit 22, was 
prepared and filed by Ellsworth-Paulsen on or about April 2, 2001. The Notice of Interest was 
filed because Broadstone was delinquent in its payments to Ellsworth Paulsen. Subsequent to 
the filing of the Notice of Interest and after discussing the same with counsel, Ellsworth Paulsen 
released the Notice of Interest on or about February 28, 2002 as per Plaintiffs Exhibit 26. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATED 
TO THE PARTIES' CLAIMS 
I. Breach of Contract 
20. This Court has previously determined that, as Broadstone's partner and joint-
venturer, 51-SPR is liable to Ellsworth Paulsen for Broadstone's contract debts. The evidence 
establishes that 51-SPR failed and refused to pay the June, July, and August 2002 draw requests, 
thereby breaching its contract with Ellsworth Paulsen. The court further finds that Ellsworth 
Paulsen completed all of the required work, and there is no evidence to establish that any of the 
work is defective or otherwise has problems. 
21. Therefore, this Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to the amounts set 
forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 27 less the $78,000 Williams property request. 
II. Abusive Lien 
22. 51-SPR has made a claim pursuant to U.C.A. §38-1-25 for abuse of lien right in 
which it has characterized as a malicious lien claim. This claim pertains to activity associated 
with the Williams property and the recordation of a lien by Ellsworth Paulsen in the amount of 
$78,000. In determining whether 51-SPR is entitled to relief under 38-1-25, the Court adopts the 
findings previously recited herein with respect to the Williams property and the $78,000 paid by 
Ellsworth Paulsen to Mr. Hatch and Broadstone. 
23. Section 38-1-3 of the Utah Code provides the following: 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services or furnishing 
or renting any materials or equipment used in the construction, alteration or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner . . . shall have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished or rented materials or 
equipment for the value of the service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively . . . 
This Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen believed it was entitled to lien, because the lien was 
9 
put in place at the instruction of Mr. Hatch in order to ensure reimbursement to Ellsworth 
Paulsen for the $78,000. At the time the $78,000 was paid, and at the time the lien was filed, 
Ellsworth Paulsen did not know how much of the $78,000 was used or applied to the 
construction of Buildings I and II. Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith and upon the 
instructions of the owner of the property when placing its lien. 
24. Section 38-1-25 of the Utah Code describes the penalties to be imposed upon 
those parties who commit an abuse of lien right. This Section states: 
(1) Any person entitled to record or file a lien under Section 38-1-3 is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor who intentionally causes a claim of lien against any 
property, which contains a greater demand than the sum due to be recorded or 
filed: 
(a) with the intent to cloud the title; 
(b) to exact from the owner or person liable by means of the excessive 
claim of lien more than is due; or 
(c) to procure any unjustified advantage or benefit. 
(2) In addition to any criminal penalties under Subsection (1), a person who 
violates Subsection (1) is liable to the owner of the property or an original 
contractor or subcontractor who is affected by the lien for the greater of: 
(a) twice the amount by which the wrongful lien exceeds the amount 
actually due; or 
(b) the actual damages incurred by the owner of the property. 
The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen did file a lien against the property in question, 
however, Ellsworth Paulsen did not intend to cloud the title to exact more than it believed was 
due or procure an unjustified advantage. 
25. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen acted in good faith in claiming the $78,000 
based upon the instruction and direction given by Mr. Natch and Broadstone. The Court finds 
that Ellsworth Paulsen's only intent in filing the lien was to ensure payment of the $78,000 it had 
given to Vintage Construction at the direction of Mr. Hatch, the owner of the property. The 
recording of the lien was done solely at the direction of Mr. Hatch to ensure that Ellsworth 
Paulsen would be reimbursed for the $78,000 it paid. At the time the $78,000 was paid, and at 
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the time the lien was filed, Ellsworth Paulsen as a result of its conversations with Mr. Hatch, did 
not know how much of the $78,000 was used or would be applied to the construction of 
Buildings I and II. This Court finds that the lien was not intended to extract from the owner 
more than was due or procure an unjustified advantage, because the lien was filed for the amount 
to be reimbursed to Ellsworth Paulsen. 
26. Ellsworth Paulsen did not cause the lien to be filed with the intent to cloud the 
property to exact more than it believed was due or procure an unjustified advantage, thus this 
Court finds no violation of U.C.A §38-1-25(1). Since the Court does not find a violation of 
Subsection (1), the penalties in Subsection (2) do not apply. However, Ellsworth Paulsen is not 
entitled to judgment against 51-SPR for such amount. 
III. Wrongful Lien 
27. As to the wrongful lien claim, the evidence establishes that Mr. Ellsworth filed the 
Notice of Interest because Mr. Hatch/Broadstone were delinquent on the payments due Ellsworth 
Paulsen, and someone in his office told him it was a good idea. The Notice remained a matter of 
public record from the time of filing, on April 2, 2001, until it was removed on February 28, 
2002, immediately following Mr. Ellsworth's consultation with counsel. The Court finds that 
the Notice of Interest was not authorized by the owner of the real property, Mr. Hatch, and was 
not a proper document to have been filed by Ellsworth Paulsen. 
28. In order for 51-SPR to claim civil liability for the filing of a wrongful lien against 
Ellsworth Paulsen, 51-SPR must qualify under U.C.A. §38-9-1, as either the record interest 
holder or record owner of the property in question. According to U.C.A. §38-9-1(6): 
"Wrongful lien" means any document that purports to create a lien or 
encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time it is 
recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of 
the real property. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1(6) (emphasis added). 
29. The Court finds that there is no evidence of a recorded interest by 51-SPR during 
the time in question. Based on the evidence produced, the Court finds that there was a real estate 
purchase agreement between Broadstone and 51-SPR pertaining to the property in question dated 
June 15, 2000 (See Defendants' Exhibit 56), but there is no evidence of recordation of ownership 
interest in 51-SPR during the time in question. The evidence only establishes an unrecorded real 
estate agreement without any notice to Ellsworth Paulsen of 51-SPR's interest in the North 
Shore project. 
30. The record owner at the time of recording of the wrongful lien was 
Hatch/Broadstone. 51-SPR was not the record owner at the time the Notice of Interest was filed. 
The Notice of Interest was filed and recorded in April 2, 2001. The release was filed on 
February 28, 2002. There has been no evidence presented for the Court to find that 51-SPR was 
the record owner as defined by U.C.A. §38-9-1 at the time of the recording of the document, nor 
has there has been any evidence to establish that a wrongful lien had any negative impact on 51-
SPR's subsequent ownership of the property. 
31. Section 38-9-4 of the Utah Code sets forth the damages and civil liability for filing 
a wrongful lien. The language of the statute provides that: 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for treble 
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, 
who records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, 
knowing or having reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(3). 
The Court finds that the Notice of Interest was an improper document to have been filed by 
Ellsworth Paulsen. 
32. Furthermore, no request was made by Hatch or Broadstone to remove the Notice 
and, under the applicable statute, Ellsworth Paulsen would be liable to the record owner at the 
time of the recording of the document. 51-SPR did provide notice to Ellsworth Paulsen by a 
letter from Mr. Chimento dated November 29, 2001 to remove the Notice of Interest (See 
Defendants' Exhibit 51), and the claim was subsequently removed on February 23, 2002. 
33. There has been no evidence to establish that as of the date of Mr. Chimento's letter 
to Ellsworth Paulsen, that 51-SPR was a "record interest holder" of the real property. The only 
evidence of ownership to the real property presented at the time of trial consisted of the deed of 
trust and promissory notes to Buildings I and II establishing Broadstone as the owner without 
any reference to 51-SPR. 
34. The Notice was released at the direction of Ellsworth Paulsen's counsel and no 
actual damages were proved. Also, no evidence of attorney's fees were proved by 51-SPR in 
connection with the removal of the wrongful lien. This Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is 
liable to 51-SPR in the amount of $3,000. Any claim for attorney's fees under U.C.A. §38-9-4 is 
denied. 
IV. Retention and Retention Interest 
35. As to the issue of retentions, the evidence produced by Ellsworth Paulsen 
establishes that the claimed retentions for Building I were in the amount of $92,939.39. The 
claimed retentions for Building II were in the amount of $47,142.77. 
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36. The Court finds that the custom and practice of Ellsworth Paulsen was to submit 
requested draws to Central Bank or Broadstone, Central Bank was to make payments based on 
these draws. The retentions represent amounts not actually paid by Central Bank. Ellsworth 
Paulsen's position is that it is entitled to interest on those amounts as retained amounts by 
Central Bank and/or Broadstone. The evidence establishes that such monies were never 
physically accounted for and retained and identified as such by Central Bank or Broadstone. The 
amounts claimed as retained monies do not exist. 
37. As to the calculation of retention interest amounts, the evidence does not support a 
finding that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to its claim for retention interest against 51-SPR. The 
monies claimed by Ellsworth Paulsen for retention were never withheld, never identified as 
retained funds by Central Bank or 51-SPR. 
38. Furthermore, Ellsworth Paulsen's claim against 51-SPR for retention interest is 
denied. U.C.A. §13-8-5(10)(b)(i) requires that Ellsworth Paulsen prove Broadstone and or 51-
SPR knowingly and wrongfully withheld a retention in order to recover. U.C.A. §13-8-5(l)(b) 
states: 
(b)(i) Any owner, public agency, original contractor, or subsequent who 
knowingly and wrongfully withholds a retention shall be subject to a charge of 
2% per month on the improperly withheld amount, in addition to any interest 
otherwise due. 
The Court finds that Broadstone and 51-SPR did not withhold retention proceeds, nor did 
they attempt to do so knowingly or wrongfully. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen failed to 
present sufficient evidence to support a finding that §13-8-5 requires 51-SPR to be responsible 
for the payment of such monies. 
V. Pre-judgement Interest 
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39. With regard to Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for pre-judgment interest, the Court finds 
that Ellsworth Paulsen cannot recovery its claim for pre-judgment interest against 51-SPR. It is 
undisputed that Ellsworth Paulsen never submitted to anyone its final payment application on 
Building I or the final two applications on Building II. These three applications remain 
unsigned. It is not possible for the Court to set a specific date on which payment of the three un-
submitted applications became due. The court has considered the information submitted by the 
parties subsequent to the time of trial with respect to calculation of pre-judgment interest and the 
court cannot, as Ellsworth Paulsen suggests, simply "pick a date" from which interest begins to 
accrue. 
40. The Court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen has not been successful in marshaling 
evidence or law to support a claim for pre-judgment interest and the court is unable to fix a date 
as to the time for calculation of that interest. Based on the evidence presented at the time of trial, 
it is clear that a date cannot be sufficiently calculated. Ellsworth Paulsen cannot recover its 
claim for pre-judgment interest on its three un-submitted payment applications. 
41. However, the Court does find that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to pre-judgment 
contractual interest on its breach of contract claim as requested, but denies Ellsworth Paulsen's 
claim for interest on its mechanic's lien foreclosure claim. 
VI. Attorney's Fees 
42. Attorney's fees are generally awarded to the prevailing party. U.C.A §38-1-18(1) 
explains that a Court is allowed to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party: 
(1) Except as provided in Section 18-11-107 and in Subsection (2), in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court, which 
shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18(1) (emphasis added). 
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43. By reason of the claims made by 51-SPR, this Court must make a determination as 
to which of the parties is the prevailing party entitled to make a claim for attorney's fees. Under 
Pochvnok v. Smedsrud, et. al.„ 2003 UT App 375, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that the 
trial court was in a better position to determine which party was the prevailing party. 
Considering all of the factors and formulas discussed in Pochvnok, the Court finds from all the 
evidence presented, that Ellsworth Paulsen is the prevailing party in the case and is entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs. The factors the Court relies on to support its findings that Ellsworth 
Paulsen is the prevailing party are as follows: 
A. Ellsworth Paulsen's breach of contract claim is granted. 
B. The work was performed by Ellsworth Paulsen and the subcontractors on 
North Shore Buildings I and II at the direction of the owner, Mr. Hatch 
and Broadstone, both under the terms of the contract and through change 
orders, with full compliance by Ellsworth Paulsen in performing all of the 
work requested by the owner. 
C. Judge Schofield previously found that 51-SPR, by reason of a joint 
venture with Broadstone and Mr. Hatch, stood in the same position as 
Broadstone. 
D. The Court has reviewed all of the evidence produced with respect to the 
amounts claimed regarding the mechanic's lien claim and has evaluated 
those amounts at issue and determined that Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to 
its claim on the mechanic's lien claim for amounts less the $78,000 
associated with the Williams property. 
44. Considering the totality of all the evidence, even though a portion of the claimed 
amount was denied to Ellsworth Paulsen, the facts support a finding that Ellsworth Paulsen is the 
16 
prevailing party. Furthermore, in this case, the facts distinguish the application of the Pochynok 
case; in Pochynok, there was an offer of judgment submitted which the Court of Appeals relied 
upon to reach its determination as to which party ultimately prevailed in the lawsuit. Here, there 
was never an offer of judgment by 51-SPR or Broadstone. 
VI. Reasonableness of Attorney Fees 
45. After the Court determined that Ellsworth Paulsen was the prevailing party, and as 
such was entitled reasonable to attorneys fees, Ellsworth Paulsen's counsel submitted an 
affidavit setting forth what it suggests are the reasonable attorney fees in this case. As required 
by the case of A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518 
(Utah App. 1999), Ellsworth Paulsen has allocated in its affidavit those attorney fees which are 
recoverable under the lien statute, from those fees which were incurred pursuing legal claims and 
theories for which it would not be entitled to a fee award. As set forth in the affidavit of counsel, 
Ellsworth Paulsen, is claiming that it is entitled to $164,993.60 for fees which are related directly 
or indirectly to its mechanic's lien claim. The Court has reviewed the affidavit using the factors 
set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Broken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988). These factors are: 1) 
Was the legal work actually performed ? 2) How much of the work was reasonably necessary to 
prosecute and defend the matter? 3) Was the attorney's billing rate reasonable in light of the 
locality and type of services rendered? 4) Are there other factors requiring special 
consideration? 
46. As to the first factor, the court finds that the attorney fees presented by Ellsworth 
Paulsen represent fees for work actually performed. The fees requested are not disproportionate 
to the amounts claimed or recovered. This is particularly so considering the amounts which were 
originally claimed by Ellsworth Paulsen, before several of the subcontractors were eliminated 
from the case through settlement. The court has reviewed the entries for the work claimed, and 
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recognizes that most of such work related to work being presented in one form or another in 
open court. In this case, many of the issues presented in the form of motions and trial work 
evidence were inextricably tied to the mechanic's lien claims. This includes the entries for such 
issues as the lien waivers, the timeliness of the liens, the writ of attachment, the legal work 
related to the alternate security, and like matters. The court finds also that the amounts claimed 
by Ellsworth Paulsen as allocated to the claims for which it can recover is reasonable in the 
amount of $164,993.60, and that the work reflected for those fees was actually performed. 
47. As to the second issue of what legal work was reasonablely necessary to prosecute 
the case, the evidence supports the reasonableness of the fees as to this factor. This action was 
complex from the beginning, with at least twelve different parties involved. The record shows 
that there were approximately 21 depositions taken, and approximately 90 motions filed. 51-
SPR asserted numerous counter-claims, which could have defeated recovery under the lien, but 
which were defeated by Ellsworth Paulsen, primarily through motions. 51-SPR has filed an 
affidavit in support of its default judgment against Broadstone and Hatch claiming fees in this 
case, and a much smaller related case, of $427,249. As such, the evidence supports Ellsworth 
Paulsen's contention that $164,993.60 is an appropriate and reasonable fee under the 
circumstances. 
48. The Court also finds that the hourly rates charged by Mr. Poulsen and Mr. Reich, 
the attorney fees for Ellsworth Paulsen, are billing rates which are customarily charged by 
attorney's of their experience. Mr. Poulsen's rate through all but the last two months of this case 
was $170 per hour, and Mr. Reich's rate was $140 per hour. These rates are customary and usual 
for this type of legal work in Utah and Salt Lake Counties. 
49. Finally, as to any special factors which support the award of fees in this case, the 
court reiterates those points referred to above when it found that Ellsworth Paulsen was the 
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prevailing party in this case. Those factors included the fact that 51-SPR breached the contract 
by failing to pay contract balances, and that all of the work, including the extra work, was 
properly and timely performed and contained no defects. Accordingly, as Broadstone's joint 
venture partner, the work should have been paid for by 51-SPR. 
VII. COSTS. 
50. Ellsworth Paulsen has submitted a verified memorandum of costs in which it seeks 
reimbursement for its costs in the amount of $7,467.73. The claimed costs consist of expenses 
for filing the action, services of process, witness fees, deposition transcripts, and certain limited 
duplication and blow-up charges for trial exhibits. The court finds that Ellsworth Paulsen is only 
entitled to get the costs of depositions on those persons who actually testified at trial. Ellsworth 
Paulsen has claimed costs for two deponants who did not testify at trial. Those persons were 
Kyle Spencer whose deposition costs were $162, and Angela Solberg who deposition costs were 
$477.60 These sums are reduced out of Ellsworth Paulsen's claim for costs, leaving net costs 
allowed to Ellsworth Paulsen for costs of $6,828.13. 
ORDER 
Based upon the forgoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to a judgment in this matter on its breach of contract 
claims and mechanic's lien claims in the principle amount of $199,830.53 on Northshore 
Building I. Ellsworth Paulsen is also awarded judgment for $364,991.26 on Northshore 
Building II, minus $78,000 for the change order representing amounts paid for work on the 
Williams property, and $3,000 for filing the Notice of Interest. This leaves a net judgment of 
$483,821.79 ($364,991.26 + $199,830.53 - $564,821.79 minus $78,000 and minus $3,000 = Net 
Judgment $483,821.79). 
2. Ellsworth Paulsen is further entitled to contractual interest of $57,863.94 in 
accordance with the attached Schedule "A. This interest rate should be augmented by the 
interest which has accrued since December 22, 2003, (the day that Schedule "A" was prepared) 
through the date of this order, which sum is $7,768.47, for a total pre-judgment amount of 
$65,632.41. 
3. Ellsworth Paulsen is also entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party in this 
case. The reasonable attorneys fees awarded to Ellsworth Paulsen is $164,933.60 through 
February 17th, 2004, to be taxed as costs as required by Utah Code. Ann. §38-18-1(1). 
4. Finally, Ellsworth Paulsen is entitled to $6,828.13 to be taxed as costs. 
In summary, Ellsworth Paulsen is awarded a judgment in the total amount, including 
principle, interest, attorney fees and costs of $721,215.93 Based upon the 10% per annum 
interest rate set forth in the parties' contract, this judgment shall continue to bear interest post-
judgment at 10% per annum, and any judgment rendered herein may be augmented by Ellsworth 
Paulsen's reasonable attorney fees through collection. The total judgment rendered in this case 
may be enforced against the Alternate Security Bond on file with the Court in which Capitol 
Indemnity Corporation is the surety. 
Dated this (IT day of ^ &p3Xm. 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JudgeXjary l /Stot t c ' 
22 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Erik Olsen 
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SUMMARY OF INTEREST DUE ON ELLSWORTH PAULSEN'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS 




















































































































































































































































































GRAND TOTAL FOR BOTH BUILDINGS $ 57,863.94 
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THIS ADOINOOM # 2 TO REAL ESTATE PURCHASE COMTRACT BETWEEN 
BROAOSTONE INVESTMENTS, LLC AND SI SOUTH PORTLAND REALTY CORP- DATED 
JUNE IS, 2000 
RE; Auto Mall Development 
The terms and conditions of this Addendum #2 are hereby incorporated in the above 
Real Estate Purchase Contract as if set forth at length therein. 
This memorandum shaH summanre the terms of the agreement* reached regarding the 
above devek>pment prefect and set forth the same in contractual form, Intending to bind the 
parties with regard thereto, as dosing of title on the real estate Is needed by 6/15/00; 
thereafter more detailed agreements In appropriate form will be prepared and executed 
reflecting the following terms: 
- Utah title company as nominee for 51 South Portland Realty,
 f a New York 
corporation (Chimento), and ^ a Utah LLC fUtab LLC) (Guy Hatch and , hts 
partner will own this, see below as to restrictions;) will acquire tide as ten^nts-ln-common (with 
a 50% interest m each) to the entire 6,58 acre parcel from Ford investment Enterprises 
Corpe ation for the purchase prtrr of $1,750,000.00 (the "Land"), 
- Chimento will contribute as capital to the project the sum or $2,900,000.00 to be 
transferred to and held by Utah Title Company as a Qualified Intermediary CQI") and applied 
as follows: 
?1,7S0,000 • to purchase 
5,000(7) - To costs of purchase 
87,000 • Commission to ReMax 
545.000 * To site Improvement costs 
643.0001 ?1 - To building construction costs (see following) 
Total * %900,000 
- Utah LLC shaH be the project manager In charge of obtaining remaining needed 
construction financing and Institutional permanent financing for Buildings I and u (hereinafter 
^office buildings"), construction supervision, leasing of the buildings, sate of the statfon/store 
#t«, and operation of the venture. Utah LLC v*» receive a fee of $135,000,00 for such services, 
payable In three Installments of $45,000.00 on *)ty 15, 2000, September 1, 2000 and October 
15, 2000, 
- Utah LLC wtll provide financing for needed construction monies for the office building 
and remaining cash needs of the project, Guy Hatch will guaranty such financing. 
- Chimento will execute mortgage as to its tenancy in common interest to secure 
institutional construction financing but wiH not be obligated on any Note or by way of guarantee 
at any time 
• Chimento funds for site development and construction costs "hard" costs only not 
•'soft" costs except the Utah LLC fees or interest) wtll be utilized prior to any other construction 
c\>ac?ocui»f^TxvwrM>ru5rKB5r^t«oj?Qc IfiDBIiSR[:E9lfSBSSB ^ ^ 
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financing, on a standard draw schedule with 10% retainage (Inclusive), to be raltased by QI 
after Inspection approval by a Chimento engineer to be retained by Chimento and paid as a 
project cost 
- Utah LLC shaft be a single member, single purpose LLC satisfactory to ro counsel for 
Chimento whose ownership interest and control shall be pledged to Chimento to secure Utah 
LLC's and Hatch's obligations, with a restriction agreement in recordable form satisfactory to NJ 
counsel In favor of Chimento es to the LLC and the LLC's tenancy tn common Interest in the 
land. 
- Utah LLC shall mortgage its tenancy in common interest in the land to CNmento to 
secure the pledge and restriction agreements ^$ welt Hatch's obligations pursuant to this 
memo, Chimento shall subordinate its mortgage only with respect to Institutional construction 
financing. Chimento win release this mortgage will be released upon completion of the project 
^nd closing of permanent Institutional financing. 
Note: Chimento's acquisition of Its interest in the project is through a "Uke-Kind" exchange and 
where the term Chimento Is used, QI shall act as Chimento's nominee until Chimento may take 
title pursuant to IR5 regulations. 
The parties intend that following completion of the project and at the time of permanent 
financing but not earlier than 1/1/2001, as they m«y hereafter agree, Chimento and Utah LLC 
may transfer their Interests to a new Utah LLC to be owned equally by them, otherwise 
consistent with the terms of this memo, but in any event the project shaH be held for 
investment and all actions by the parties shall be in furtherance of that goal. (New Utah LLC 
documents to be satisfactory to M counsel for Chimento). 
- The development project shall be on a cash basis with a calendar year end, 
- Chimento shall receive a 10% return on Ks capital commencing December 1, 2000 
through the end of the nrst year following closing on the und, to be paid monthly commencing 
on 1/1/2001. Hatch shall guaranty such return, to be paid from operating income of the project 
if sufficient, and if not, then from proceeds of sale of a portion of the (and - the 
station/convenience mart, if any, Utah LLC shall contribute any and all sums to the project 
needed for payment of such return. 
- Any net operating income remaining m the first year, to Hatch. 
• Chimento shall have the option to receive a 10% return on its capital for a second year 
on terms set forth above for year l, or to shire 50/50 in net operating income of the project for 
the year following dosing on the Land. 
- Thereafter Chimento and Utah, LLC shall share SO/SO in net operating income of the 
project. 
- Permanent financing *••« "take out" all financed construction costs (including soft costs 
and teasing costs) (No brokerage »s to be paid to Hatch or affiliated entities) and the project or 
buildings individual wW secure the same if financed as to the whole or individually, ine parties 
agree to consult as to the amount of permanent financing which may exceed the above and, if 
51-SPR 00191 
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agreed, such excess to be applied as follows: to Chimento to reimburse in the following order 
as available, (() land closing costs; (H) allocated construction costs, Le, building 1 and building 
2; (M|) allocated site improvement costs, i.e., building 1 and building 2; and (iv) allocated land 
costs, i.e, building l and 2; end after Chimento capital repaid In full, to each 50/50, 
• Subsequent capital transactions (reflnnnces, sales, casualty or condemnation) &(\cr 
debt repayment to: (j) remaining unpaid Chimento capital; and thereafter (ii) to each 50/50. 
Distributions of net operating income after completion of construction, to be made not less than 
quarterly. 
Distribution from capital transactions no later than 20 days after receipt. 
All decisions regarding the project shall be mutually made after consultation. 
Monthly construction and teasing reports to be Submitted by Hatch. 
Quarterly statements to be submitted wfehin 30 days of close of quarter. 
Year end statements to be submitted within 45 days of dose of year. 
Tax ret.ns to be prepared, and delivered to tenants-ln-common within 75 days of close of 
yttot. 
Such returns shall reflect th<*t the property is held as tenants-in-common interests and not as a 
partnership, Alt such elections shall be mad* to be consistent with this. 
Hatch's development entity (not Utah LLC) shall enter Into a consulting agreement with 
Chlmentos, individually, with regard to property development Inclusive of the project, to a term 
running through March I, 2001, for a fee of $2«,00Q,00 ptc month payable monthly 
commencing July 1, 2000 (except the July 1, 20QQ payment shall be $12,000.00). 
The provisions of this Addendum shaH survive closing of title. 
51 SOUTH PORTLAND REALTY CORP. 
BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LLC 
C:*JY gVCVM*NV3i»rm\l'lt'15 * f »8\M*l*0 t>OC 
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DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLSWORTH PAULSEN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY dba ELLSWORTH PAULSEN 
CONSTRUCTION SERVICES dba 




BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, et al, 
Defendants. 




BROADSTONE INVESTMENTS, LC, et al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT CHIMENTO 
Civil No. 010405059 
Judge Schofield 
Civil No. 020400442 
(consolidated) 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) 
ROBERT CHIMENTO, having been first duly swom, hereby deposes and states: 
1. I am the manager of 51-SPR LLC ("51-SPR"), the plaintiff in the above-
captioned action. I make this affidavit on personal knowledge and, if called as a witness, would 
testify thereto. 
2. In early 2000, Guy Hatch ("Hatch"), a real estate developer, solicited 51-
SPR to invest in a real estate development located in American Fork, Utah (the "Property") 
known as the Northshore Project. 
3. Hatch and Dan Parkinson ("Parkinson") organized Broadstone 
Investments, LC, ("Broadstone"). 
4. Broadstone entered into a contract entitled "Addendum # 2 to Real Estate 
Purchase Contract Between Broadstone Investments, LLC and 51 South Portland Realty Corp. 
Dated June 15, 2000" (the "Agreement"), under which 51-SPR agreed to invest $2.9 million 
toward the purchase and development of the Property. 
5. Under the Agreement the parties agreed that the Property would be 
subdivided into three separate parcels on which three commercial buildings would be 
constructed. 
6. Under the Agreement, Broadstone and Hatch were solely responsible for 
all expenses, costs, losses, and risks associated with the Northshore project, including the cost of 
purchasing the Property, obtaining construction financing and institutional permanent financing 
for the buildings, hiring a general contractor, supervising construction, leasing the buildings, 
managing the Property, taxes, utilities, and preparing monthly construction and leasing reports, 
quarterly and year-end financial statements; and tax returns. 
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7. The parties agreed that Broadstone would be paid a fee of $135,000 for its 
services and for assuming responsibility for all potential losses associated with the Northshore 
project. 
8. The Agreement specifically provided that the Property would be held by 
51-SPR and Broadstone as tenants-in-common and not as a partnership. 51-SPR has never 
agreed at any time to act as a joint venturer or partner with Broadstone. 
9. The Agreement provided that 51-SPR "will not be obligated on any Note 
or by way of any guarantee at any time." 
10. 51-SPR was not liable or responsible for any losses, liabilities, or 
responsibilities relating to the Property, and under its arrangement with Broadstone, stood to lose 
only its investment in the Property and nothing more. 
11. Broadstone, and not 51-SPR, executed all of the contracts associated with 
the property, including loan documents, construction contracts, and tenant leases. 
12. Broadstone contracted directly with Central Bank to obtain construction 
loans, and at the time of the loans, the record title holder of the Property was Broadstone. 
13. Hatch and Parkinson personally guranteed the loans. 
14. Broadstone entered into two contracts with Ellsworth Peck Construction 
Company ("Ellsworth Peck"), under which Ellsworth Peck agreed to act as general contractor in 
the construction of two buildings on the Property. 
15. 51 -SPR was not a party to the construction loan agreements that 
Broadstone entered into with Ellsworth Peck. 
16. Ellsworth Paulsen completed the construction of the two buildings on the 
Property in April and July 2001, respectively. 51-SPR is informed and believes that after those 
3 , ; r ; ; ^ 
dates, little or no work was performed under the two contracts between Broadstone and Ellsworth 
Peck. 
17. On September 7, 2001, Ellsworth Paulsen recorded its first notice of claim 
of lien with respect to Broadstone's debts to Ellsworth Paulsen in connection with construction 
on the Property. 
18. The September 7, 2001, lien was not recorded on the Property. 
19. The September 7, 2001, lien was never served on 51-SPR, which is the 
record owner of the Property. 
20. Broadstone failed to live up to its obligations under the Agreement. 
21. Broadstone materially breached its Agreement with 51 -SPR and attempted 
to conceal its breaches. 
22. These material breaches are the subject of claims that 51-SPR has raised 
against Broadstone, Hatch, and others in connection with the above-captioned action and are set 
forth in 51-SPR's complaint. 
23. 51-SPR entered into two other agreements with Broadstone in the fall of 
2001, which are identified in 51-SPR's Amended Complaint in this action. 
24. 51 -SPR discovered Broadstone's breaches and confronted Hatch in late 
2001. Hatch agreed that Broadstone had breached its other agree 
25. On behalf of Broadstone, Parkinson filed an action in this Court entitled 
The Dan Parkinson Family Limited Partnership in the right of Broadstone Investments, L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company, vs. 51-SPR-LLC, a Utah limited liability company. Civil No. 
010404897, claiming that Broadstone owns one-half of the subject property. That suit is 
currently pending. 
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j v,-,-, ronsnlidatcd with Broadstone. 
26. 51-SPR has never merged or bixn consoimaico 
v. if ;„•.«.« in the Properly. 51-SPR has never 
27. Besides Btoadslone's one-ball interest m the op 
acquired any o r BroadstonV s other asse*. 
28. 51 -SPR has noi « t a aver * _ * * , « ' * business a c t i o n s . 
2 9 . 51-SPR has never agreed to assume B r o a d ^ debts or liabilities. 
30. 51-SPR did « « acquke Broadato^. one-half Merest m the Pmpcrty with 
is ncr«np liabiluv for Broadstcmc's debts, 
the intent to defraud Broadstcme's creditors pr to escape liability 
DATED this _ L . day of June, 2002. 
SUBSCRIBED iD AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this / 2 - d a y of June, 2002, 
1 4> 
Notary Public - CUIIfafni* f NOTARY PUBLIC 
Lo.Ana.i-County f
 R _ _ i d m g a t ; , California vg____»7 a gela* County r 
^ a P ^ MryC^riin,^ iMMMv12r2a06f 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ,/- day of June, 2002, I caused a copy of the 
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT CHIMENTO to be mailed, postage prepaid, by United 
States Mail, to the following: 
Mark L. Poulsen, Esq. 
NELSON SNUFFER DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Attorneys for Richard M. Ellsworth 
David R. Nielson, Esq. 
OLSEN SKOUBYE & NIELSON, LLC 
Centennial Plaza, Suite 307 
45 West 10000 South 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Attorneys for Westwood Mill 
Dana T. Farmer, Esq. 
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, PC 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Attorneys for Halverson Mechanical 
Deloy M. Sallenback, Esq. 
313 East 1200 South, Suite 104 
Orem, UT 84058 
Attorneys for Hubbs Tile, Inc. 
Steven D Crawley, Esq. 
Conrad H. Johansen, Esq. 
BABCOCK BOSTWICK SCOTT CRAWLEY & PRICE 
57 West 300 South, 8lh Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Allstate Electric, be. 
6 
Daniel O. Duffin 
DUFFIN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Decorative Landscaping 
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VINTAGE CONSTRUCTION LLC 
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